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RÉSUMÉ DE SYNTHÈSE
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La pièce théâtrale de Shakespeare intitulée Hem-y V est à propos d’un projet de
l’unification nationale. C’est grâce à la prouesse de rhétoricien et de commandant de
l’héro éponyme de cette pièce que le projet précité est réalisé. Hemy V, qui ne tarit pas
d’éloges du nationalisme, s’est prêté parfaitement au projet de propagande du cinéaste
anglais, Laurence Olivier, durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. En outre, ces éloges
situent l’oeuvre de Shakespeare, aussi bien que l’adaptation d’Olivier au sein du
paradigme de la souveraineté moderne, que Hardt et Negri décrivent dans leur livre
intitulé Empire. Cependant, l’utilisation de cette pièce comme propagande pour la guerre
des États-Unis contre l’Iraq, durant l’ère impériale postmoderne demeure surprenante.
En effet, la question qui se pose, dans cette situation, est la suivante Comment est-ce
qu’une pièce qui fait l’éloge du nationalisme peut-elle servir comme propagande dans
une ère durant laquelle, si on prend le livre de Hardt et Negri en considération, le
nationalisme est sur le déclin?
Ma thèse est divisée en trois chapitres. Mes deux premiers chapitres traitent de la
manière avec laquelle la pièce théâtrale de Shakespeare et le film d’Olivier portent leurs
soutien à la nation bourgeonnante de l’Angleterre, aussi bien qu’à la Grande Bretagne,
durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Par ailleurs, dans mon premier chapitre, je mets en
exergue le plan d’unification nationale d’Henry V. J’examine également les stratégies
aux quelles il a eu recourt, lors de l’exécution de son projet. Vers la fin de ce chapitre,
j’analyse le rôle crucial que de la distorsion joue dans le processus de l’écriture d’Hemy
V, qui a pour but d’unifier les anglais à travers le théâtre, l’un des principaux composants
de la machine idéologique de la Renaissance anglaise.
Dans mon deuxième chapitre, je propose une lecture des scènes majeures qui
doivent être éliminer avant que l’héros éponyme de la pièce théâtrale de Shakespeare
devienne acceptable pour le publique britannique des années quarante. Mon étude de ce
processus se base sur l’adaptation cinématographique de cette pièce théâtrale par
Laurence Olivier. Je vais aussi souligner le rôle qu’a joué la politique discriminatoire du
Ministère de l’Information britannique, dans la production de ce film.
Dans mon dernier chapitre, mon attention se porte sur la comparaison que les
médias américaines établissent souvent entre George W. Bush et l’héro de Shakespeare,
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après les attaques terroristes du 11 Septembre. A travers une lecture d’ Hemy V, le livre
de Hardt et Negri, aussi bien que l’article de Laffey et Weldes intitulé «La
Représentation de l’International : La Souveraineté Après la Modernité » (ma traduction),
je propose une étude de la nature complexe du nouvel ordre économique et politique, qui
marque l’ère de la mondialisation. Dans cette étude que je propose, je ne favoris aucune
lecture du nouvelle ordre, car ma lecture, dans ce cas, sera sans doute bornée. En effet,
ce que je démontre, dans mon troisième chapitre, est qu’une juxtaposition de
l’importance du passage de la souveraineté moderne à la souveraineté impériale sur
laquelle Hardt et Negri mettent l’accent, d’une part, et l’internationalisation de l’état
comme une structure de pouvoir, dont Laffey et Weldes nous parlent, dans leur article
précité, est indispensable pour une meilleure compréhension du nouvel ordre mondial.
Shakespeare, mondialisation, Henry V, l’adaptation cinématographique d’Olivier, la
formation de la nation
ABSTRACT
XWilliam Shakespeare’s Herny V is about national unification brought about by a
Machiavellian king through his rhetorical and military prowess. It also celebrates the
unity of the ranks of the English and presents it as a sine qua non for their victory over
the French. These aspects of the play made it suitable for propaganda purposes, during
World War II. They also situate both Shakespeare’s play and Olivier’s adaptation of it
well within the paradigm of modem sovereignty, as Hardt and Negri describe it in
Empire. What is striking, however, is that this very play representing the quintessence of
nationalism and modem sovereignty is used in the age of empire to portray George W.
Bush and his war on Iraq. Indeed, Hardt and Negri contend that the contemporary world
order is based primarily on the erosion of national sovereignty and that “the United States
does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project”
(xiv). Here, a question begs to be asked: how can Herny V be of any use in a world
where national sovereignty is on the wane, if we are to believe Hardt and Negri?
Answering this question is part ofthe task I set for myseif in this thesis, which falls into
three parts.
In my first and second chapters, I will examine the way Shakespeare’s play and
Olivier’s adaptation of it reflect and serve the burgeoning English nation state and the
ftilly developed British nation state ofthe 1940s respectively. In fact, in my first chapter,
I will examine Henry V’s Machiavellian scheme of national unification and will outline
the major strategies to which he resorts in his historical task. furthermore, I will examine
the role strategies such as deletion and distortion played in the process of the writing of
theplay.
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In my second chapter, I intend to explore the major instances of deletion and
distortion the play lias to undergo before Shakespeare’s Henry V becomes a heroic figure
that does flot offend the sensibilities of the British viewers of the 1940s. I will also
underscore the role played by the Ministry of Information’s discriminatory policies in the
production ofthe movie.
In my last chapter, I focus my attention on the commonly drawn parallel between
George W. Bush and Shakespeare’s Henry, in post 9/11 America. Through a
juxtaposition of the play, Hardt and Negri’s Empire, and Weldes’s and Laffey’s article
“Representing the International: Sovereignty after Modernity,” I will study the intricate
nature of our globalizing world order. In this regard, I will not be favoring Weldes and
Laffey’s reading ofthe current world order over that ofHardt and Negri, as that will only
lead us to see one side of this world order. Rather, I will show that bringing together
Hardt and Negri’s emphasis on the passage from modem sovereignty to empire, and
Laffey and Weldes’s focus on the internationalization ofthe state as a structure ofrule is
crucial to reaching a better understanding of our current world order.
Shakespeare, Globalization, Heniy V, Olivier’s cinematographic adapatation ofHerny V,
nation formation
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INTRODUCTION
2As one wanders along Mcgill Avenue, in Montreal, and reaches the
Paragraphe bookstore, one’s attention is imrnediately attracted by the picture of a
modemized Shakespeare—with earphones—advertising the books of the
aforementioned bookstore as “THE RIGHT STUFF.” This bookstore’s recourse to
Shakespeare is symptomatic of the extensive use of the cultural authority of the bard,
nowadays. The bust of Shakespeare’s head concealing the switch that controls the
entrance to the ‘Batcave’ in the television series Batman the picture of a modemized
Shakespeare on the bookmarks, bags, and windows of a Montreal bookstore, as well
as the use of his work for propaganda purposes, at different periods of time, and in
different places constitute what Graham Holdemess cails “the real Shakespeare” (VS
93). Holdemess’s conception ofthe real Shakespeare refers to:
A vast and enormously complex system of reftacting prisms: the
whole multifarious body of ideas, attitudes, assumptions, images,
which have accmed over centuries of cultural activity centered on the
literary productions ofthis Elizabethan dramatist, and which constitute
at any given historical moment the ideological problematic in which
Shakespeare is recognized. (93)
In my thesis, I intend to examine this “real Shakespeare” through the study of the
odyssey of his Herny V from 1599, through its use as propaganda in Britain, during
World War II, to its use again as propaganda in post 9/11 America. In order to do
this, I will approach this play from a Cultural Materialist perspective (Holdemess 93).
What is interesting about juxtaposing these three distant moments in the
odyssey ofHemy Vis that it highÏights the wide gap between early rnodernity, on the
one hand, and postmodemity, on the other hand. Indeed, both the play and Olivier’s
adaptation of it present us with conceptions of the nation, identity, war and the enemy
that are characteristic of the modem paradigm of sovereignty, as both Hardt and
3Negri describe it, in Empire. Studying the specificities of the early modem and
modem world orders make us ail the more aware of the distinct nature of our
contemporary world order, which Hardt and Negri cail Empire. What is striking
about the parallels drawn between Henry V and Bush and their respective wars is that
they use a play which exemplifies the modem paradigm of sovereignty, to talk about
the policies of the superpower that is presently leading our postmodem globalizing
world order. A flindamental question I wili try to answer in my thesis is: how can a
play that anticipates the increasing sovereignty and importance of nation-states be
used to qualify a world where, if we take Hardt and Negri’s Empire into account, the
sovereignty ofnation-states is declining?
In the first chapter of my thesis, my reading of the play will underline a
common aspect of both New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, namely
“understand[ingj the iiterary text, in its socio-cultural field” (Kamps 6). That is, I
will show that an exploration of the political and historical circumstances under
which Hem-y V was written is a sine qua non for a good understanding of the play.
The ambiguities that such critics as Norman Rabkin and Sara Munson Deats see in
the play will dissolve through the “radical contextualizing of literature which
eliminates the old division between literature and its ‘background’, text and context”
(Dollimore and Sinfield PS 4). Juxtaposing Shakespeare’s Hem-y V, Niccolo
Machiavelli’s The Prince, Erasmus’s The CompÏaint ofPeace and The Education ofa
Christian Prince, I intend to show that Shakespeare’s Henry V is rather an exemplary
Machiavellian prince. In this sense, I will diverge from Deats and Rabkin whose
work does underline the richness of the play, but fails to find the logic behind the
4coexistence of the Machiavellian and the Christian sides of the king. Here, I argue
that Henry’s masquerade as a pious Cbristian prince plays a central role in his success
as a Machiavellian king. I will also emphasize this Machiavellian side of Henry V
through an examination of the Machiavellian strategies he uses. Among these, I will
focus mainly on bis use ofreligious discourse, his recourse to international war, and
his building of a citizen-army. Henry deploys this Machiavellian arsenal with a view
to achieving national unification.
Then, I will move to the arsenal deployed by Shakespeare in his depiction of
an ideal, unified England. Among the major components of the Shakespearean
arsenal, in this respect, are the bard’s recourse to religious discourse and dïstortion, as
weJl as to his “aesthetic colonization” (Dollimore and Sinfield HI 221) ofthose sites
of potential dissent in Elizabethan society. Indeed, the cohesion and unity of the
English reflected in Heniy V is the result of muting the dïssenting voices of the frish,
the Scottish, and Welsh, as well as the voices of characters belonging to the category
ofmasterless men, like Bardolpli, Nym, and Pistol.
To end my first chapter, I will examine the ideological significance of the
death of falstaff, in Heniy V. Indeed, I will show how lie can stand metaphorically
for the multitude, which, according to Hardt and Negri, had to be crushed by the
counter-revolution to forge the people, in the Renaissance. I will approach this
question through the insightful reading Hardt and Negri offer of the revolution and
the counter-revolution that characterized the Renaissance.
In my second chapter, I will examine the use ofHerny Vin World War II, in
Britain, through Laurence Olivier’s cinematographic adaptation. Furtherrnore, I will
5shed light on the circumstances under which the movie was produced, emphasizing
the crucial role the Ministry of Information (MOI) played in shaping its propaganda
message during World War II. Then, I will examine the aspects of the play Olivier
had to delete or distort in order to present the British wartime audience with an
acceptable heroic figure.
In the third chapter of my thesis, I will juxtapose Hardt and Negri’s Empire,
Shakespeare’s Herny V, and Paul A. Passavant and Jodi Dean’s Empire ‘s New
Ctothes: Reading Hardt and Negri, in an attempt to articulate the complex nature of
the current giobalizing world order. Here, I argue that what makes Herny V relevant,
in the postmodem context of the war on terror, is the crucial role the
intemationalization of the American state plays in the present configuration of global
power. Comparing the conceptions of the enemy, the nation, and the war,
characteristic ofthe world of Shakespeare’s Heniy J’Ç or even that of Olivier’s, on the
one hand, and their mutations in our globalizing world order, I intend to show that the
world, in the afiermath of 9/11, can be read as a postmodem version ofthe Polybian
model. This is one of the elements I will deal with in my last chapter. I will also
examine the intemationalization of the American “band of brothers” and the
American structure of mie, the postmodem nature of the ubiquitous terrorist enemy,
and the different nature of the war (IV. 3. 291). Ail these elements, signal the
difference of Shakespeare’s England and Olïvier’s Britain from the postmodem
configuration of global power in the twenty-first century.
Chapter I
Neither a Rabbit, Nor a Duck, It Is a Freak of Nature: Heury V’s Machiavellian
Project of National Unification
7Though adaptations of Shakespeare’s Henry V during the Second World War
and in the Bush administration’s campaign for the war on Iraq in 2003 celebrate the
eponymous hero’s courage, resolve and patriotism, a close reading of the bard’s play
makes us realize the reductiveness of such a reading. To put it in Rabkin’s terms, the
propagandist production of Olivier (1943), for instance, instead ofproviding a picture
that can be seen either as a “duck” or as a “rabbit,” categorically chooses an
alternative and presents it as the only possible interpretation (246). Interestingly
enough, a survey of the literature on Hemy V reveals that a similar reductive
interpretation marked the earlier works of criticism on the play. lndeed, most articles
written before Karl P. Wentersdorf s “The Conspiracy of silence in Herny V” have
seen Henry V either as an ideal monarch1 or as “a Machiavellian militarist who
professes Christianity but whose deeds reveal both hypocrisy and nithlessness”
(Rabkin 245).2
Through a juxtaposition of Shakespeare’s Heniy V and Erasmus’s The
Education ofa Christian Prince and The CompÏaint ofPeace, I intend to show that
Henry V cannot be considered as an ideal Christian prince, but rather as an ideal
mode! Machiavelli. Then, through a juxtaposition of Machiavelli’s The Prince and
Shakespeare’s play, I will outline the different Machiavellian strategies to which
Hem-y V resorts in bis project of national unification.
The publication of Wentersdorf s article in 1976 marked the beginning of the
second phase in the history of the scholarly criticism on Herny V. This phase is
Sec Sherman Hawkins, wlio represents the other end oftlie critical spectrum. He lias discemed in
Henry V the traits of”an exemplary Christian monarch” (Rabkin 259).
2 Sec Harold C. Goddard, who “lefi us a devastating attack on Henry V as Sliakespeare’s model
Machiavellian” (Rabldn 256).
8characterized by the emphasis critics lay on the importance of disceming both the
duck and the rabbit in Henry V. Underlining the ambivalence of the protagonist’s
character is—as Rabkin, a major representative of this critical trend, notes— one way
of avoiding a reductive reading of the play. He points this out clearly, in “Rabbits,
Ducks, and Herny Vi” when he says “1 hope that simply by juxtaposing the two
readings I have shown that each of them, persuasive as it is, is reductive, requiring
that we exciude too much to hold it” (26O).
Among the most recent articles written on Hemy V is Deats’ “Henry V at
War: Christian King or Mode! Machiavel.” In this insightful article, Deats
acknowledges the role Rabkin’s article played in revolutionizing the critical
enterprise as far as Herny Vis concemed. She states clearly, at the beginning of lier
work, that her
[s]tudy supports and develops Rabkin’s interpretation. Focusing on
the much contested topic of war as it is examined in Shakespeare’s
epic drama, my essay argues that Heniy V can be read as either a
celebrafion of the eloquent, ebullient monarch and his astonishingly
lopsided victory over the french or as probing deflation of both
rhetoric and war, depending on the perspective from which the text is
viewed and the elements foregrounded by the interpreter. ($3-4)
Like Rabkin’s article, Deats’s acknowledges the different possible readings and
juxtaposes them to underscore the wealth of the play.4
The juxtaposition of the different possible readings of Hemy V, which both
Rabkin and Deats undertake, clearly do more justice to the play than the reductive
interpretations provided by the Manichaean critics referred to above. Indeed, they
“Them”, here, refers to the Manichaean interpretations ofthe play that characterized the flrst phase of
the history ofthe literatiire written on it.
These different readings resuit from considering the play from the following perspectives: “Henrv V
as an exemplum ofthe ‘functional ambiguity” identified byPatterson, the dramatic arguments on both
9study flot only the attributes that make Henry seem an ideal “Christian King,” but
also those that make him a “model Machiavelli” (Deats 83). However, the problem
with both Rabkin’s and Deats’ readings is that they only succeed in enumerating the
Christian and Machiavellian characteristics of Henry V, but do flot attempt to explain
the relationship between the hvo. Structurally speaking, their articles mark a certain
schizophrenic division between the two facets of the ldng. This is more clearly the
case ofRabkin, whose article is divided clearly into four parts. The second part ofhis
article deals with the different traits ofHenry V that warrant his characterization as an
ideal Christian king, whule the third presents us with those that won him the titie of
Machiavellian prince. Likewise, Deats contrasts Henry’s Machiavellian side with bis
Christian one.
It is this relationship between the Machiavellian and Christian sides of Henry
V that I will deal with, in this first chapter of my thesis. I will also to show that the
very characteristics both Deats and Rabkin take as making up the Christian facet of
the king are simply a sine qua non for a Machiavellian prince to succeed in lis
historical task. According to Rabkin, these characteristics are mainly to be discemed
in Henry’s $t. Crispin’s speech, in which he acknowledges a hand of brotherhood
between bis soldiers and himself(IV. 3. 291). It is also apparent in “the king’s ability
to listen to the soldier Williams and to hear him which suggests like bis subsequent
fooling with Fluellen in the same fourth Act, a king who is fully a man” (Rabkin
253). As far as Deats is concemed, the Christian side of the king is communicated to
sides ofthe question discussed by Altman, and die perspective puzzles examined by Gilman” (Deats
84-5).
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the reader/ spectator through the interventions of the chorus and the laudatory
accounts we get from the bïshops at the beginning ofthe play (I. 1. 21-2).
Although Paul A.Cantor’s “Christian and English Mercuries,” as well as
Rabkin’s and Deats’s articles, to mention but a few, refer to the two models of the
Christian king and the model Machiavelli, they do flot trace back the two models to
their sources, mainly when it cornes to the Christian King. Knowing these sources
can only better our understanding of the play. The two models corne down to us from
a genre that was popular during the early decades of the sixteenth centuiy, namely
advice to princes manuals, or mirrors for princes. The books that are classified under
this genre aim at presenting a “substantive discussion of political ideas [that) are
organized around a narrative order—the transformation of the prince into an ideal
king” (Jardine xvii). The Machiavellian model, which is more thoroughly discussed
by critic, though not satisfactorily, is inspired from Niccolô Machiavelli’s The Prince
(1513). As far as the Christian model is concemed, it is derived from Erasmus’s
response to Machiavelli’s manual, which came in the form of a book entitled The
Education of a Christian Prince (1516). lronically enough, when one reads
Erasmus’s book, one is surprised to find that even the Christian side ofHenry pointed
out by Deats and Rabkin does not qualify hirn as a Christian prince, from an
Erasmian perspective.
Henry V’s St. Crispin’s speech, his ability to listen to the common soldier
Williams, as well as the laudatory accounts we get of him, are the major elements
which, according to Deats (8$) and Rabkin (252), win him the titie of a Christian
king. However, we kriow that the St. Crispin’s speech—mainly its emphasis on the
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fact that “[f]or he today that sheds his blood with me! Shah be he ne’er so vile! This
day shah gentie his condition”—is simply a rhetorical stratagem to boost the morale
of the soldiers (IV. 3.291). In fact, the bond of brotherhood that supposedly unites
Henry and his soldiers dissolves when it cornes to reading the hist of the Enghish
casualties. At that point in the play, the vile is revealed to be vile. This can be
clearly seen in the following unes “Edward the Duke of York; the Earl of $uffolk;!
Sir Richard Keighley; Davy Gam, esquire;! None else ofname, and ojaïl other men/
Butfive-and-twenty” (IV. 8.330, emphasis mine).
What Henry seems to have used, not to say abused, in the speech quoted
above is his knowledge ofthe way oflife ofthe common people he spent a lot oftime
studying before lis accession to the throne. Indeed, his St. Crispin’s speech with its
description of the proud deeds of a veteran, belonging to the lower classes, stems
from the king’s understanding of the psychology of the commoners. To illustrate
this, I may mention Henry’s reference to the soldier who, on St. Crispin’s day,
“will. . .strip his sleeve and show his scars, / And say ‘these wounds I had on Crispin’s
day” (IV. 3. 290). These unes prove the fact that the king bas put the archives of
knowledge he compiled, during his “wilder days,” to good use, as he informs the
French ambassador, at the beginning of the play saying “we understand him well,!
How he cornes o’er us with our wilder days, ! Not measuring what use we made of
them” (I. 2. 149). The king’s understanding ofthe commoners’ psychology can more
strikingly be seen through an examination ofPistol’s final speech. Indeed, bis plan to
go to “England, and there I’ll steal; / And patches will I get unto these cudgeled scars,
/ And swear I got them in the Gallia wars” show that Hal’s apprenticeship in the
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underworld of common people lias enabled him not only to understand these people’s
way of thinking and habits, but also to anticipate their actions (V. 1. 344). Here, I do
flot mean that Henry anticipated the way Pistol would deceitfully use his scars, but
rather that he anticipated the pride a lower class veteran would take in his war scars.
This instance of the king’s use of bis past familiarity with this kind ofpeople simply
makes him unworthy of the titie of Christian king, which Rabkin bestows upon him
on account of the very speech considered above, from an Erasmian perspective (IV.3.
290). In fact, in his The Education ofa Christian Prince, Erasmus contends:
{i]t is the mark of the tyrant, indeed an underhand deception, to treat
the people at large in the way that animal trainers customarily treat a
wild beast; for their prime concem is to observe what pacifies it or
what arouses it, and then they provoke or soothe it to suit their own
convenience, Plato lias forcibly remarked. For that is flot to take
popular feeling into consideration but to abuse it. (73)
Taking this Erasmian dictum into account, Henry’s use of the archives of knowledge
he lias compiled, during bis apprenticeship, in the lower class undenvorld in order “to
make” the soldiers “fight cheerfully,” as the dissenting soldier Williams puts it before
the Battie of Agincourt, make it difficuit to consider him a model Christian king (IV.
1.269).
The other major element in the play that makes it even impossible for us to
cali Henry V a model Christian king is his waging a war on a Christian neighbor,
namely the french, to fulfili bis Machiavellian project of national unification.
Juxtaposing Erasmus’s The Education of a Christian Prince, The Coinplaint of
Peace, and Shakespeare’s Hemy V, one cannot but consider Henry’s war as unjust.
In fact, in the last part of his The Edttcation of a C’hristian Prince, entitled “On
Starting War”, as well as in lis The Comptaint ofPeace, Erasmus makes it clear that
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war is totally incompatible with the tme spirit of Christianity, as “the whole
philosophy of Christ argues against war” (ECP 105). Another relevant aspect of
Erasmus’s book The Complaint ofFeace is its criticism ofbishops and priests who
preach, support, and even wage wars (like Pope Julius II). In this respect, he states:
[n]either bishops, cardinals, nor Christ’s own vicar blush to become
the instigators, the very fire-brands of war, against which Christ, from
whom they pretend to derive the only authority they can have,
expressed his utter detestation. (CP 35-6)
An equally important aspect of The Complaint ofFeace to take into account when
considering the controversial issue ofthe causes that may “justify” war is Erasmus’s
remark: “but T blush to record, upon how infamously frivolous causes the world has
been roused to arrns by Christian kings. One of them has found, or forged, an
obsolete musty parchment, on which he makes a daim to a neighboring territory”
(Erasmus CP 31). Uncannily enough, this description of the common pretexts
Christian kings presented in the early modem period to justify their wars is an
adequate summary of the second scene of the first Act, in which the Archbishop of
Canterbury delivers a perpiexing account of the genealogical history justifying Henry
V’s daim to the French throne. The other pretext Shakespeare’s Henry uses to justify
lis war is the insulting gifi of tennis balis sent to him by the Dauphin. Taking into
account the fact that Henry’s war is justified by pretexts, it cannot be considered just,
despite the king’s seeming devotion to God and lis daims that God fights with him
against another Christian country. This is implied in the following unes, delivered by
Henry afler lis victory in the Agincourt battie:
[o]h God, thy arm was here;! And flot to us but to thy arm alone/
Ascribe we ail. When, without stratagem, / But in plain shock and
even play ofbattle, / Was ever known so great and littie loss/ On one
‘4
part and on th’ other? Take it, God, I for it is none but thine. (IV. 8.
331)
In fact, Henry’s assertion that “O God, thy arm was here, / And not to us but
to thy arm alone/ Ascribe we ail” insinuates that God is fighting on Henry’s skie
against himself(IV. 8. 331). This is precïsely what Henry asserts when lie says that
“in plain shock and even piay ofbattie, / Was ever known so great and littie ioss/ On
one part and on th’ other? Take it, God, / For it is none but thine” (IV. 8. 331). This
wholesale carnage of the French at the hands of the Engiish is seen by Erasmus as
parricide (Adams 103) because according to him “Christians are ail brothers, and
therefore between them war is parricide” (Adams 103). Thus, we can conclude that,
from an Erasmian point of view, Henry’s war on France is parricidal and unjust.
Adams’s contention that Erasmus’s “basic premise is that war is a violation of
uncorrupted Christian man’s trne nature, whose mode! must be Christ’s own life.
Therefore, war is virtually always unjust” (95) further backs up my argument.
Consequently, he cannot, from an Erasmian perspective, be considered an ideai
Christian king, as lie faiis to meet a major requirement a Christian king lias to meet,
namely avoiding war, which is the “abomination” of the Prince of Peace, Christ
whose “dear delight is peace” (CP 16). This is the God Henry accuses offighting on
his behaifto kili other Christians.
Here, I contend that Hemy V is weli versed in masquerading as a Christian
king and using religious discourse to achieve lis ends. This qualifies him for the titie
of a Machiaveiiian prince rather tIan an Erasmian Christian monarch, mainly when
we know the emphasis Machiavelli puts on the roie the use of religion lias to play in
helping the prince keep a firm control over his state. In the following part of my
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chapter, I will deal with the way Shakespeare’s Henry V can be taken as an
embodiment ofMachiavelli’s conception ofthe prince, through an examination ofthe
strategies to which the king resorts in his project of nation unification. Among these,
I will focus mainly on his recourse to international wars, the forging of a citizen
army, the importance of a reputation for crnelty, as well as the recourse to religious
discourse. Although, as Rabkin asserts, the threatening speech Henry V delivers to
the people ofHarfleur and his order to kiil the Frencli prisoners (257), along with his
unjust war on France make Henry qualify for the titie of a Machiavellian prince, I
find that the Machiavellian side of the play outlined by most Shakespearean critics
remains very much reductive both ofthe bard’s play and ofMachiavelli’s The Prince.
Indeed, when one reads the work ofthe critics mentioned above, one can see that they
equate the philosophy of Machiavelli with a lack of morality. This reductive reading
of Machiavelli stems, to a large extent, from the fact that the critics do not give us an
account of the similar political and historical contexts that produced Shakespeare’s
work and Machiavelli’s.
Here, I argue that such a reductive understanding of Machiavelli can only
produce works of criticism that see Henry V either as “a rabbit” or “a duck” (Rabkin
246). In the best of cases, it produces readings juxtaposing the two without the least
attempt at finding a link between, what I would cali, two sides of the same coin.
Deats’s and Rabkin’s readings of the play can be safely classified under this category.
In fact, as I have shown above, the devotion to Christianity, which some critics
discem in the eponymous hero, is no more than a weapon in Henry’s Machiavellian
political arsenal. Had lie been a trnly devout Christian king, he would have followed
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such principles as the ones outlined by Erasmus. He would flot have waged an unjust
war on a Christian neighbor, or issued the order to kili the french prisoners. Thus,
what is Christian about Henry is merely skin-deep and utilitarian. This is exactly
what Machiavelli recommends in the following passage:
[a] prince, then, must be very careful not to say a word which does flot
seem inspired by the five qualities I mentioned earlier. To those
seeing and hearing him, he should appear a man of compassion, a man
of good faith, a man of integrity, a kind and a religious man. And
there is nothing so important as to seem to have this last quality. Men
in general judge by their eyes rather than by their hands; because
everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to corne in
close touch with you. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few
experience what you really are. (5$)
Machiavelli’s awareness ofthe importance people accord to the moral side of
the king and ofthe fact that “the prince should. . .avoid anything which will make him
hated and despised” lead him to stress the importance of seeming religious for the
popularity and success of the prince (5$). To use Rabkin’s phraseology, I would say
what we see in Henry is neither a rabbit, nor a duck, but probably a freak of nature we
may cail a rabbit-duck. In short, for the Machiavellian prince to succeed lie lias to
don the attire of a Christian king, without necessarily being one.
What lends more support to my contention that Henry V is rather a model
Machiavelli donning Christian apparel is the striking similarity between
Machiavelli’s and Shakespeare’s works. The political circumstances under which
both writers produced their works are marked by a clear instability. Moreover, both
writers, as Tim Spiekerman puts it, share remarkably similar concems (25). for
instance, both deal extensively with “how political power is acquired and maintained”
and “scrutinïze the relation between morality, particularly Christian morality, and
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political practice” (Spiekerman 25). Quoting Spiekerman at length further illustrates
this resemblance:
[t]hat Shakespeare knew of Machiavelli is certain: there are three
references to him in his plays, two in the Histories. It is flot certain,
however, that Shakespeare knew Machiavelli’s writings firsthand.
The most critics and historians can establish is that he couÏd have read
him, that copies of The Prince, both in Latin and English, were
available and read by educated sixteenth-century Englishmen. The
most compelling evidence that Shakespeare knew Machiavelli’s
writings is also the most impressionistic: one needs only a casual
acquaintance with The Prince and The Discourses to hear persistent
echoes in Shakespeare’s plays... It seems that one could illustrate
almost any Machiavellian principle with an example from one of
Shakespeare’s plays. This may prove only that both men knew a lot
about politics; but it also proves that Shakespeare knew what
Machiavelli knew, whether or not he’d read him. (25)
Here, I argue that a juxtaposition and close reading of both works enable us to detect
an affinity between the writers’ responses to the issues with which they deait. In this
sense, Shakespeare’s Herny V can be seen as the theatrical counterpart of
Machiavelli’s The Prince. Like Machiavelli, Shakespeare is aware of the importance
people pay to the moral side ofthe king. This can be seen, for instance, through what
the souder Michael Williams says about the king’s war. He is also conscious of the
fact that a prince “should do what is necessary under the circumstances, which
sometimes demand virtue, other times vice” (Spiekerman 28). The ambiguity and
duality critics like Deats and Rabkin detect and reflect in the way they present their
arguments, dissolves when we take into account the bard’s awareness of the
expectations of the people and the exigencies of the prince’s task—a prince faced
with a country on the brink of chaos.
In this part ofmy chapter, I will deal with the way Shakespeare’s Henry V can
bc taken as an embodiment of Machiavelli’s conception of the prince through an
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examination of the strategies to which the king resorts in his project of national
unification. The Machiavellian strategy of recourse to international war, however, is
not the only Machiavellian rule by which Henry V abides in the play. Indeed, taken
as a whole, Shakespeare’s work seems to be an enactment of Machiavelli’s The
Prince, through the theatrical medium. This can be explained by the similar historical
conjunctures that produced both writers and by their similar concems. Aware of the
threats posed to the welfare and unity of England by her sworn enemy the Spaniards,
the rebellion in Ireland, the conflict between the war party of the Earl of Essex and
Sir Walter Raleigh and the peace party of Sir William Cecil, Elizabeth’s Prime
Minister, Shakespeare tries to subtly provide a solution by presenting Machiavellian
strategies to which the Queen can resort in a time of national emergency (Deats 85).
Machiavelli searches “in Rome ami its history for the exemplary historical rehearsal
of those laws of political practice to be observed to ensure the triumph of Italïan
unity” (Althusser 45). Likewise, Shakespeare searches English history “to ensure the
triumpli of [English] unity” (Aithusser 45). He presents the reader/ spectator with a
“Renaissance dream corne true, the ideal monarch, in control of himself and his
nation” through the figure of Henry V, the Lancastrian king (Cantor $2).
One important element that Machiavelli deems fundamental for the forging of
a national whole under the prince consists of a recourse to international war waged by
a specific type of army, namely a citizen-army (as mercenary, auxiliary, and
composite armies can only lead to his ruin). Having witnessed the chaotic state of
affairs that plagued his father’s reign (Mowat 287-8) and remembering lis father’s
dying advice to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels,” Henry V wages a war on
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france with his citizen-army (IV. 5. 213-4). In this way, he manages to tum ail
possible dissent or even hatred against a national common enemy, nameiy their “bad
neighbor,” the French (IV. 1. 257). Thus, in the very act of waging the war, he
unifies English people from ail waiks of life—the ciergy, noble men, and
commoners—by bringing them together in one amiy faced with the same enemy. It
is precisely this unifying power of a citizen-army that Althusser seems to underscore
when he says, “[i]n these conditions we can appreciate why the army is the cmcibie
of the people’s political and ideological unity, the training school of the people, the
becoming people of the people” (MU 102). This can be seen at work in
Shakespeare’s play through Henry’s Harfieur speech, in which he rhetorically brings
together ail the English including “the noble English, / Whose blood is fet from
fathers of war-proof’ (III. 1. 202) and the “good yeomen, /whose limbs were made in
England” (III. 1. 203). Then, in a sentence, he magically unites the soldiers
belonging to these two classes, when he says “for there is none of you so mean and
base! That bath flot noble lustre in your eyes” (III. 1. 204). It is probably the fact that
Henry’s army is a citïzen-army that accounts, among other things, for its victory over
the French army. The latter’s recourse to “mercenaries” to whom Henry refers, when
lie reads the list ofthe “slaughtered French” is one ofits weak points (IV. 8. 328). In
fact, Machiavelli is categorical about the problems posed by this type of army when
lie says:
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince
bases the defense of bis state on mercenaries lie will neyer achieve
stability or security. for mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power,
undisciplined, and disloyal; they are brave among their friends and
cowards before tlie enemy. (40)
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As if in response to this very Machiavellian dictum, the coherent body of Henry’s
citizen-army is made up of Englishmen from ail walks of life, as weli as of people
from Engiand’s then beiligerent neighbors, namely the Irish, the Welsh, and the
Scottish.
This is where we can see the “aesthetic colonization,” to which Dollimore and
Sinfield refer, at work (HI 221). Indeed, when the piay was performed Essex was
sent to cmsh a rebeliion in Ireland. Moreover, during the reign of Henry W, Owen
Giendower maintained open war in Wales and on the border of England and Waies
for eight years (Mowat 287). Ireland was constantly rebelling against English
domination. Here, of course, ideoiogy plays a fundamental role in presenting these
belligerent parties, mainly the Irish party, as parts that fit harmoniously in the English
whole. This is brought about through their incorporation in the national army flot as
mercenaries—the way highlanders used to be depioyed by the crown in its quelling
rebellions in Ireland, at the time of the writing of Hem-y V—but as obedient and
faithful national subjects. Although the Irish $cottish and Welsh captains do flot
“speak English in the native garb,” as Gower puts it near the end of the play, and
although fluellen and Macmoris quarrel, they are wholeheartedly devoted to the
English cause (V. 1. 342). When “the town sounds a parley” the Welsh and frish
captains forget their skirmish and go hurriedly to join the other soldiers (III. 3. 215).
However, when we consult historical books dealing with the reign of Henry V, we
can see that just the opposite happened.
The cohesion and integrity of this army, with its different social and regional
categories, is only maintained through another Machiavellian strategy, nameiy a
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necessary reputation for cmelty. Here, I will refer, for instance, to the much debated
scene oftlie execution ofBardolph for stealing a “pax” (III. 6. 234). Most critics who
deal with this scene, including Deats (92) and Rabkin (259), can oniy see through it
the unfaithfulness of the king to a former companion, and his Machiavellian use of
lis friendship to people from the lower classes to know them better in order to control
them more easily, once enthroned. This interpretation underscores an important
aspect of the scene, namely the moral one. But, again this type of interpretation
seems to reduce the Machiavellian doctrine to the strategic importance it gives to
morality. This means that the prince abides by the dictates ofmorality as long as that
does not threaten bis status, power, and reputation as a prince. Bearing Machiavelli’s
teachings in mmd, one can see that Henry’s decisïon to “have ail such offenders so
cut off’ is a necessary cruel act that enables him to keep the army disciplined and
deter other soldiers from breaking the law (III. 6. 239). This decision on the part of
Henry V would be, according to Machiavelli, an instance of the king’s political virtu.
Indeed, he contends that “a prince must flot worry if he incurs reproach for his cruelty
so long as lie keeps his subjects united and loyal. By setting an exampie or two, he
will prove “more compassionate than those wlio, being too compassionate, allow
disorders which lead to murder and rapine. These nearly aiways liarm the wliole
community, wliereas executions ordered by a prince only affect individuals”
(Machiaveili 54). Througli the execution of Bardolph, Henry V will be abie to set an
example ail the more deterring, as lie did not spare even a former acquaintance, thus
guaranteeing the reigri of order, stabiiity, and discipline over bis army. This is one
lesson Shakespeare implicitly teaches Eiizabeth, as I wiil show later. This
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understandïng of cruel acts on the part of Henry V as an attempt to keep things under
control, as far as bis army is concemed, can also appiy to whole societies. Here, ït is
important to remember the tight relationship between the peopie and the army for
Machiavelli. Aithusser hints at this when he says that the former is the “training
school” of the latter (MU 102).
This necessary cruelty is also related to another fundamental Machiavellian
principle stating that “it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot both”
(Machiavelli 54). One of the conspirators, Cambridge, sees that Henry V lias
achieved both when he says that there is “neyer [...] monarch better feared and ioved
/ Than is your majesty” (lI. 2. 168-9). As we know that Cambndge has taken part in
the Southampton plot against Henry V, we arc not to take bis words at face value, but
we become ail the more aware of the importance of Machiavelli’s work to a good
understanding of Shakespeare’s Hemy V. However, the relevance of this
Machiavellian principle can be seen at work more manifestly in the conspiracy plot,
which seems to have taught the king flot to rely solely on the love of bis subjects. li
fact, Lord Scroop—once the king’s bedfeiiow who bore “the key to ah [lis]
councils,” and knew “the very bottom of [his] soul”—ended up conspiring against
him (II. 2. 174). This very plot seems to have taught tIc king that “Men worry less
about doing an injury to one who makes himself Ioved than to one who makes
himself feared” (Machiavelli 54).
Ail these Machiavellian strategies, like forging a national whole by waging
international war with a citizen-army and making good use of crnelty, when
necessary, are meant to enable the ruler to achieve stability and cohesion in society.
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A close reading of the play seems to indicate the way out for monarchs and to
anticipate uncannily Louis Althusser’s work on ideology. What Shakespeare seems
to be doing in his Hemy V is an illustration of the workings of the Cultural
Ideological State Apparatus (Aithusser TS 1489), avant la lettre. Indeed, according
to Aithusser the “State Apparatus” consists of two major parts, namely the
“Repressive State Apparatus” and the “Ideological State Apparatus” (T$ 1489).
While the former includes the army, the police, and the government, the latter
includes such institutions as the Church and schools. It is also under the latter that we
find the Cultural Ideological State Apparatus, in which we may situate Shakespeare
and his works (Aithusser TS 1489). The most important characteristic of the
Ideological State Apparatuses is thàt they function primarily by ideology and, to a
lesser extent, by force. This can be seen at work through Shakespeare’s play. Indeed,
censorship which vas a fundamental part of the proto-Renaissance Cultural
Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser TS 1489) used to draw the boundaries that no
playwright should cross, on pain oflosing his work, if not lis life. Bearing this factor
and the close relationship between the Court and the theatre allow us to guess that the
Ideological discourse with which we will be presented enhances the status ofthose in
power, in one way or other. David Scott Kastan points this out when he says:
“[d]ramatic production in Shakespeare’s England was neyer an autonomous authorial
achievement but a complex social and theatrical activity in which authorship was
only one determinant” (102). This does flot mean that plays staged on the
Elizabethan stage were devoid of subversive content. However, as Kastan argues,
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when dealing with Shakespeare’s repiacing the name of Oidcastle with that of
Fal staff:
[n]o doubt some form of interference from above led Shakespeare to
change Oidcastie’s name to ‘falstaff’ but scrutiny and regulation were
among the determining circumstances ofpiay making no less than boy
actors in the theater or casting off copy in the printing house.
Playwrights worked with and around censors to get their texts to the
stage and into the shops. (104)
furthermore, Hem-y V is a perfect exampie of what Jonathan Dollimore and Alan
Sinfield eau aesthetic colonization of ail the rebellious quarters in Elizabethan
England, as they find that the piay is about:
[n]ational unity: its obsessive preoccupation is insurrection. The king
is faced with actuai or threatened insurrection from almost every
quarter: the Church, ‘treacherous’ faction within the miing class,
sianderous subjects, and soldiers who undemiine the war effort, either
by exploiting it or by skeptically interrogating the king’s motives. Ail
these areas of possible resistance in the play had their counterparts in
Elizabethan England and the play seems, in one aspect, committed to
the aesthetic colonization of such eiements in Elizabethan culture,
systematicaily antagonism is reworked as subordination or supportive
alignment. (HI 221)
What Shakespeare does to bring about this aesthetic coionization of sites of resistance
and to try to colonize the minds ofthe Elizabethan spectators is to represent
[n]ot the system of the reai relations which govem the existence of
individuals to the real relations which govem the existence of
individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real
relations in which they live. (Althusser 011499-1500)
In this sense, Hemy V works the way ïdeology does. In fact, the bard distorts the
Southampton plot, and resorts to religious discourse, as weil as to the incorporation of
a partisan chorus to present the spectators with an imaginary relation to their
“conditions of existence” (Aithusser 011499). It is worth noting that the imaginary
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relations of the subjects to the king, the representative of the Aithusserian Subject, is
given particular importance, as I will show later.
Among the ideological arsenal with which Shakespeare provides Henry V,
religion seems to occupy a key position. Indeed, it is thanks to his recourse to the
religious discourse that Henry V succeeds in winning over characters in the play who
“interrogate the king’s motives” in his war on France (Doilimore and Sinfield 221).
Inscribing his war on france from beginning to end in a supportive divine scheme is
one of the major elements that enabie him to do that. Through his speeches before
and afier the war, Henry makes it seem that he is fighting a holy war, or paradoxically
as it may seem, a crusade, on behalfofa God whose “arm was here! and flot tous but
to thy arm aione/ Ascribe we ail” (IV. 8. 330). Ascribing the war to God, who caimot
be accused of being unjust, along with the fact that “God so graciously hath brought
to light” the “Southampton plot” sanctify Henry’s war and make it seem legitimate
and just (Il. 2. 180). With a rhetorical sleight of hand, Henry V makes the viewer/
reader, in a way, unable to criticize or biame him without criticizing and blaming
God, who has supported the war from beginning to end. It is the reiigious world
outlook (Aithusser 01 1498) in which Henry’s scheme is inscribed that reinforces the
Renaissance hierarchical ordering of society into “diverse functions” or classes (I. 2.
143).
This world outiook is presented as the natural order of things by the
representative of this Religious Ideological State Apparatus, namely Archbishop
Canterbury (Althusser TS 1489). Indeed, Canterbury’s final honey bee speech makes
unconditional obedience to the monarch, as well as the hierarchical structure of
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society and ail the injustice ensuing from it, as simply the natural order of things. In
simplistic terms, that is the way God wants things to be. This, in tum, implies that
whoever does flot abide by the mies of this system, which is ordained by God and
nature, is simply an “inhuman creature” (II. 2. 174) and an “English monster” (11. 2.
173). This is precisely what Dollirnore and Sinfield ailude to when they say:
The principal strategy in ideology is to legitimate inequality and
exploitation by representing the social order which perpetuates these
things as immutable and unalterable—as decreed by God or simply
natural. Since the Elizabethan period, the ideologicai appeal to God
has tended to give way to the equally powerful appeal to the natural.
But in the earlier period both were crucial: the laws of degree and
order infened from nature were further construed as having been put
there by God. (HI 216)
Here, it is worth noting that the social hierarchy is respected throughout the play.
Indeed, Herny V opens with the notorious honey bec speech with its reference to the
heavenly division of “the state of man in diverse firnctions” (I. 2. 143). The
Archbishop’s speech cails upon the people belonging to different social classes and
different giiilds to respect their “diverse functions,” the way their counterparts in the
beehive do. In this hive, the Archbishop spots “a king, officers of sort, magistrates,
merchants, soldiers and civil citizens,” whose harmony and welfare are the resuit of
the respect they show to their different functions (I. 2. 143-4).
The stability and unity of the nation depends on respecting this system. In
fact, if the subjects belonging to the different social classes comply with the mies of
the social structure they would “work contrariously, / As many arrows loosed severai
ways/ Corne to one mark,” (I. 2. 144) to help the rnonarch achieve his “one purpose”
(I. 2. 145. The king’s purpose, here, is national unification. As Althusser says, the
Religious Ideological State Apparatus “forge[s] the Beautiful lies so that, in the belief
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that they were obeying God, men would in fact obey the Priests and Despots, who are
usually in alliance in their imposture, the priests acting in the interests of the Despots
or vice versa” (011499). Herny V clearly shows the intricately interrelated interests
of the king and the Church. In fact, the latter not only sanctifies Henry’s war on
France, but also invests in it “a mighty sum! As neyer did the clergy at one time/
Bring in to any of your ancestors” (I. 2. 139). In retum, a biil of law that would take
away “the better lialf’ of the Church’s possessions will not be implemented (I. 1.
123). It is such common interests bringing together monarchy and the Church that
prompt the latter to provide the former with means to control and even dispose of
dissenting subjects. This can be clearly seen through the way Shakespeare depicts the
notorious Southampton plot. The conspiracy of Scroop, Cambridge and Grey against
the life of an illegitimate king, namely Henry V, is seen by the latter as “another fali
ofman” (II. 2. 176).
What is also interesting about the representation of the Southampton plot is
the distorted version Shakespeare gives us of it, We can see how it was meant to
present the Elizabethan viewers with an imaginary relation to reality. Indeed, when
we consider the way the Southampton plot is presented in Shakespeare’s play, we do
flot leam about the real motives of the conspirators, namely the illegitimacy of Henry
V as king, and the existence of a more legitimate claimant to the English tlirone,
namely the Earl of Mardi. Ratier, what we get to know about the motives of the
conspirators is that they were greedy for the gold offrance, and that this evil plot was
spurred by their “cruel,” “ungrateful,” “savage,” and “inhuman” nature (II. 2. 174).
This is wliat Peter Saccio highuights when lie says: “Shakespeare omits to point out
28
that the conspiracy even had dynastic motives” (74). Though, here, we cannot say
that the bard distorted his sources, as both “Hall and Holinshed [...] introduce the
Cambridge plot as inspired by french bribery,” we can safely say that lie did not take
their later discussion of “the dynastic motive” into consideration (Saccio 74).
Shakespeare’s description of the Southampton Plot along with the fact that ail the
conspirators end up acknowiedging the greatness of the king and their own monstrous
and unnatural intentions is one way the play aestheticaily colonizes an antagonistic
element in Elizabethan culture, namely the treacherous faction within the ruling class
(Dollimore and Sinfieid HI 221).
Another major component in the Shakespearean ideological arsenal consists
in bis providing the viewer/ reader with a positive representation of the monarch. In
fact, according to Aithusser’s enlightening reading of Machiavelli’s work, a prince
can only succeed in bis historical task, if he inscribes a positive portrait of himseif in
popular ideology. Though having good amis and a citizen-army are of paramount
importance to the success ofthe king’s national project, these two important elements
in the prince’s arsenal alone cannot lead to his success. To carry out his project
successfully, lie bas to combine force and ideoiogy. Taken along with the way the
question of the legitimacy of Henry V is approached, this distorted representation of
the Southampton plot allows Shakespeare to inscribe in popular ideology a positive
representation of Henry V, in particular, and of the Aithusserian Subject, in general
(Althusser MU 99). In fact, if we leave out the king’s prayer before the final battie of
Agincourt, where he refers to bis father’s overthrow of Richard Il—the only ancestor
he refers to throughout the play is Edward III—his grandfather. Even the king of
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France describes Henry’s bravado in the following terms: “{tjhink we king Henry
strong; / And, princes, look you strongly arm to meet him. / The kindered ofhim hath
been fleshed upon us, / [...J 0f that black name, Edward, Black Prince ofWales” (II.
4.190). This presentation of the king as descending flot from a father who has
transgressed the divine laws, but from his valiant grandfather aims at presenting the
Elïzabethan audience with a correct ideological relation between prince and people,
via the positive “representation of the figure of the Prince” (Aithusser MU 99).
Rather than the negative attitudes the English people may have had towards the son
of a usurper—who violated divine laws, Heniy V imposes a positive imaginary
relationship between the Elizabethan spectators and the protagonist.
Other elements contributing to this positive ideological representation of the
monarch can be found in the latter’s recourse to the Machiavellian strategy stating
that “princes should delegate to others the enactment ofunpopular measures and keep
in their own hands the means ofwinning favors” (Machiavelli 61). The play abounds
with illustrations of this Machiavellian principle. To give but a few examples, I will
refer to the way the king cunningly makes the conspirators sentence themselves to
death, at the end of Act II, scene ii. He does not start his meeting with the
conspirators by accusing them. Rather, he devises a stratagem to delegate to others—
here the conspirators—an unpopular measure consisting of causing him to show the
“mercy that was quick in us but of late/ By your counsel is suppressed and killed” (Il.
2. 173). Moreover, when lis army is besieging Harfieur, he teils the Govemor that
the people of Harfleur will be responsible for alI the barbarian and savage acts the
Englisli soldiers will undertake, if they do not yield. He states: “What is’ t to me,
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when you yourselves are cause, 11f your pure maidens fali into the hand. / 0f hot and
forcing violation?” (III. 3. 217). Though he is the one who is going to teli the soldiers
what to do, he puts the blame on the people of Harfieur who are defending their town
from foreign invasion.
Another equally important element in the Shakespearean ideological arsenal is
the chorus. A close reading of different interventions of the chorus makes us aware
ofthe clear resemblance between the way it works and the way ideology works. That
is certainly why Gunter Walch has referred to the chorus as the “working-house of
ideology” (Walch 198). Through his constant appeals to the viewers to see what is
not actually there, he wants them to have “an imaginary relationship to their real
conditions” (Althusser 01149$). Indeed, it is only through the choms’s reliance on
the “imaginary forces” of the spectators (I. 0. 120) and thanks to the latter’s “ek[ing]
out our performance with your mmd” (III. 1. 201) that the “unworthy scaffold” mms
into “the vasty fields offrance” (I. 0. 120). Here, I would say that what Shakespeare
has done throughout his play, by analogy, is to take historical accounts from Hall and
Holinshed, imagine the version that would present monarchy, in general, and Henry
V, in particular, in the most positive of lights and present it as a ready-made seamless
ideological fabric that can be passed for reality. This can be clearly seen in the way
Shakespeare presents not only the Southampton plot, but also in the subtle way with
which he contains and excludes potentially subversive subjects like the “three antics,”
namely Bardolph, Nym, and Pistol, and their late leader, falstaff.5
Here, I am concentrating rather on Shakespeare’s treatment ofthese characters. I chose not establish
a comparison between Shakespeare and Holinshed’s Chronictes in this respect, as there no
connterparts ofthe three antics in the latter.
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The raison d’être of this ïdeoiogicai fabric is to present us with an ideal
picture of English society “as a spurious unity” and to “efface conflict and
contradiction” (Dollimore and Sinfieid HI 219). This can be seen at work flot only at
the levels of social classes, but aiso at the geopoliticai level. The Engiish nation,
which is symbolicaily represented by the English army is flot only made up of the
English yeoman and noblemen, but also of people from such belligerent neighboring
nations as Wales, Scotiand, and Ireland. This presentation of the Engiish nation as a
“band of brothers” (IV. 3. 291) depends on the repression of those who may cause
“social instability” and threaten that unity (Dollimore and Sinfield HI 215). Instances
ofthis abound in the play. In fact, ail the elements that do flot fit in are either iiterally
disposed of iike Falstaff, or represented in such negative terms that they become flot
worthy of sympathy, like the “three antics,” namely Nym, Bardoiph, and Pistol (III.
2. 207). These four characters who stand for a residuai ideological discourse, and
who present a style of life opposed to the one opted for by the converted Hal, are ail
shown in a negative light. The three antics are shown to behave disgracefully in the
Gaula war, during which they spend their time piiiaging. b further iegitimize the
king’s choïce in tuming his back on them, an apparently neutrai character, the boy
servant who accompanies them, depicts them negatively when he says:
[a]s young as I am, I have obseiwed these three swashers. / I am a boy
to them ail three, but all they three, / Though they would serve me,
could not be man to me, / for indeed three such swashers do not
amount to a man! (III. 2. 206-7).. .They wili/ steal anything, and cal! it
purchase. Bardoiph stoie al Lute-case, bore it twelve leagues, and sold
it for three-/ HaIf pence. Nym, and Bardoiph are swom brothers in!
fiiching, and in Calais they stole a fire-shovel I knew. / . . .Their
viiiainy goes against my weak stomach, / And therefore I must cast it
up. (III. 2. 207-8)
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With this negative portrait of the three old companions of the king, no one wilÏ bÏame
him for dissociating himself from such a bad and dishonorable company. A poorer
and supposedly more neutral character, a boy, bas dissociated himself from them
without the least rernorse. Likewise, falstaff, HaJ’s best friend, is discarded by Henry
because ofthe incompatibility of bis phulosophy of life with the strategic position Hal
bas to take to tum into a successful Machiavellian prince wbo can daim the support
of religious authority. Hal’s breaking bis promise of remaining faithful to faÏstaff
bas neyer failed to arouse the aversion of spectators/ readers. Henry V bas to be
understood against this background. Here, what has to be taken into account,
however immoral it may sound, is that for a prince to be successful in his historical
task, he bas to bear in mmd that:
[e]veryone realizes how praiseworthy it is for a prince to honor his
word and to be straightforward rather than crafty in bis dealings;
nonetheless contemporary experience shows that princes who have
achieved great things have been those who have given their word
lightly. (Machiavelli 59)
This is exactly what Henry V does when he breaks bis promise to his former friend,
someone who used to be in bis favor, the way the Earl ofEssex once was with Queen
Elizabeth.
However, I would suggest that disposing of falstaff can also be interpreted
metaphorically as the defeat of the immanent forces that characterized the first mode
of the Renaissance, at the hands of the counter-revolutionary mode. This second
mode of the Renaissance aimed at controlling the first mode which “[posed]
humanity and desire at the center of history” (Hardt and Negri 74). Defeating this
first mode of the Renaissance plays a fundamental role in the constitution of a
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coherent national whole, which, in tum, depends on crushing the spirit of freedom
and non-conformity characterizing falstaff. Indeed,
[tjhe latter’s behavior, his drinking, carousing, stealing, and cowardice
on the battiefield might strike one as an easy-going surrender to the
low animal passions, a life of siothfui indolence. But Faistaff is not at
ail easy-going. Unlike the mn of the miii degenerate, who knows he is
doing wrong but is too weak or too lazy to mend his ways, Falstaff is
degenerate by choice. He has considered and rejected the arguments
against his indulgent behavior. In bis famous critique of honor on the
battlefleld, falstaff shows himself to be a strident skeptic of ordinary
opinion. (Spiekerman 143)
This description of falstaff s choice of a path different from the one proscribed by
religion, which has helped the counter-revolution to defeat the revoiutionary flrst
mode of the Renaissance, and bis Dionysian celebration of life seem to allow for our
reading him as representative of the multitude that has to be cmshed in order for the
homogeneous people, “a constituted synthesis that is prepared for sovereiguty, to
emerge” (Hardt and Negri 103). By metaphoricaily killing him, at the beginning of
the play, Shakespeare seems to proclaim the victory ofthe Thermidor with Henry V’s
successful project of unification.
At this juncture, I will shed light on the masked subversive potentiai of
falstaff in relation to what I have been referring to as the Machiavelli-like
responsibility Shakespeare shoulders implicitly in Hem-y V. Here, I shifi the focus of
my reading from the potential effects of the Shakespearean ideological fabric on the
Elizabethan viewers to one particular potential viewer, namely the queen. Not only
was Queen Elizabeth interested in Shakespeare’s plays, but she was also someone
who could interfere with the decisions of the writer conceming bis fictional creations.
lndeed, it was even at ber request that Falstaff, for instance, was kept in The Meny
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Wives of Windsor, which was written to respond to “Elizabeth’s demand to see
Falstaff in love” (Dutton 103). But, then, in Herny V, he is depicted in a negative
light as a “fat knight with the great-belly doublet: he wasl Full ofjests, and gipes, and
knaveries, and mocks” (IV. 7. 313). This negative portrait of the knight is, of course,
meant to justify the king’s “killing his heart” with ingratitude, as the hostess puts it, at
the beginning of the play (II. 1. 163).
The history of the performance of this play gives us an insight into the
potential reasons behind this representation of Falstaff, the name Shakespeare gives
to Sir John Oldcastle in order to mask and contain his subversive potentials, and
reduce them merely to Epicureanism. This can be clearly seen through a play that
was performed by the rival company the Rose, in September 1599. This play, which
was entitled Sir John OtdcastÏe, was designed as a corrective to the Globe company’s
use of Oldcastle. It certainly:
[rlubbed in the Chamberlain Men’s hasty change of his name to
Falstaff, for which they had apologized in the Epilogue to 2 Herny IV.
The prologue to the new play asserted that ‘it is no pampered glutton
we present, / A valiant Martyr Oldcastle is represented flot as a clown
but as the Lollard martyr, enemy ofthe Catholic Churcli.’ (Gurr 21) 6
This play reveals not only Shakespeare’s intention to contain the knight’s subversive
potentials, but also the real reason behind the Southampton plot, mainly the fact that
Mortimer is a more legitimate claimant to the English throne than Henry V, and flot
financial profit, as Shakespeare would have us believe.
Historical accounts of the knight’s potential real counterpart, Sir John
Oldcastle, teil us that lie “had served the crown under Henry IV, had fought on the
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Welsh March and in France, and had been attached in some capacity or other to the
prince’s household” (Mowat 96). At one point in lis life, lie was on good terms with
Henry V. As a leader of tlie Lollards, Oldcastle led the rebellion against the abuses of
the Catholic Church. Kastan describes him in the following terms: “[li]e lield
heterodox views. He was widely understood to be a protector of lieretical preachers,
and was himself in communication with Bohemian Hussites and possibly sent
Wycliff literature to Prague” (97). What is important about the rebellion that the
potential real counterpart of Falstaff led is that it furtlier relates Oldcastle, as a major
source of subversion, to a certain love of life, but also to a conception of the
community of believers, that is close to Hardt and Negri’s conception of the
multitude. In fact, this movement advocated the individual response of believers to
the Bible, which was then translated into English by John Wycliff, the founder of the
Lollard movement. This, of course, leads to a community of singular believers with
their individual interpretations of the Bible. This implicit celebration of the spirit of
the multitude links Oldcastie and lis fictional counterpart, Falstaff, to tlie flrst mode
of the Renaissance, through the opening up of a space for singular interpretations of
tlie Holy Scriptures. from a Machiavellian vantage point, given tlie fact that the new
king was not thoroughly established, such a popular figure and liardy knight as
Oldcastle was dangerous, and had, therefore, to be disposed of, if Henry V was to
strengthen lis hold on power.
Here, I argue that masking the subversive attributes of the real counterparts of
Falstaff not only serves to contain him, but also to set a precedent for the queen wlio
6 The same attitude is adopted by Gary Taylor who is “committed to the original and the restored
presence ofOldcastle in the play” and who “bas argued that Oldcastle’s notoriety as a proto
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is facing a similar problem. In fact, the relationship of Henry V to Falstaff is quite
akin to that between Elizabeth and the Earl of Essex. The popularity of Essex, with
bis military prowess, like the military exploits and religious dissension of Oldcastle
threatened the unique position of power occupied respectively by Queen Elizabeth,
who could not rival the military feats of Essex, and by Henry V. Indeed, a close
reading of Essex’s commission in light of what was to happen to the Earl makes it
clear that Elizabeth’s appointing Essex to the office of Lieutenant-General and
Govemor of Ireland was a Machiavellian stratagem to which the queen resorted so as
to get nd of lier dangerous rival, the Earl of Essex (Cadwallader 31). The major
articles involved in the commission text are so cunningly pbrased tliat they can allow
for a manipulative interpretation, if need be. Among these articles, I may refer to tlie
one that eventually lcd to tlie beginning ofEssex’s end, and which states that:
[a]s you would lose time by sending to us for instructions, in case lie
[Tyron] should refuse tlie above conditions, we give you furtlier
authority to take him in upon such conditions as you shah find good
and necessary for our honor and safety of the kingdom. (Cadwallader
33)
According to this article, absolute power and freedom are given to the Earl of Essex
to determïne tlie appropriateness of tlie conditions upon which to grant pardon to
Tyron, the leader of the rebellion in Ireland. But, there seems to be an implicit trap in
this article consisting in tlie fact that Essex’s interpretation has to be made in sucli a
way as to guarantee the honor and safety of the queen. The problem, here, is that the
safety of Essex actually depends not on bis interpretation of things but on the queen’s
interpretation of that interpretation. Given the fact that Queen Elizabeth was
suspicious of Essex wlien slie sent him to Ireland, we can guess tliat if bis Trish
Prostestant hero is precisely that which demanded Shakespeare’s travesty (Kastan 99).
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mission increased her suspicion, the queen would easily dispose ofher rival through a
manipulation of the text of the commission. That is exactly wliat liappens as the
queen puts it in a letter to Sir Jeffrey fenton, $ecretary for Ireland:
[w]e do find by the manner of Essex his report that he [Tyron]
seemetli to liave been much carried on to this cause of submïssion in
respect of tlie opinion he had ofhim, and the confidence lie had by lis
mediation to procure ail lis desire. Tyrone professing, as it seemed by
Essex lis words, that such was lis affection to himself for his father’s
sake, as he wouid not draw his sword against him, but lie would do
that for him which lie would not do for any, other. [If lie]... would
forbear to draw lis sword against our lieutenant rather tIan agaÏnst us,
we shah take oursef thereby much dishonored, and neither could
value anything that shail proceed from liim. (Cadwallader 62, italics
mine)
Here, I contend tliat Henry V can be seen as the dangerous rival into wliom Essex
may develop, if lie is to “[bring] rebellion broadhed on lis sword” (V. 0. 335). In this
regard, the play provides, through tlie fate allotted to falstaff, a Machiavellian
solution that would lielp out the queen who was jealous of the popularity of Essex
with the masses (Cadwallader Preface). If we are to go back to history and see liow
Essex’s life ended, we can see, in a way tliat the queen may liave benefited from
Shakespeare’s implicit lesson. Indeed, nowhere is the threat of such a figure as Essex
more powerfully conveyed than in the Ïast doms but one, wlien tlie chorus says:
[t]lie Mayor and ail lis brethem in best sort, / Like to tlie senators of
tlie antique Rome! With the plebeians swarming at their heels, I Go
forth and fetch their conquering Caesar in! As, by a lower but as
loving likeliliood, / Were now the General of our gracious empress, /
As in good time he may, from Ireland coming, / Bringing rebellion
broached on lis sword. (V. 0. 334-5)
Cadwaliader’s book on the career oftlie Earl ofEssex, which includes a good number
of quotations from Shakespeare’s work, uncannily hints at tlie fact that Elizabeth was
bearing in mmd the dangers Shakespeare saw in the public welcoming of the Earl.
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This may probably account for lier flot announcing the retum of Essex, isolating him,
confining him to the tower of London, and flnally, refusing to grant lis last wish,
namely being hung in public. Commenting on the very unes I quoted above,
Cadwallader says:
[H]ow different was Essex’s home-coming from that predicted by
Shakespeare in the prologue of Heniy V. Instead of a triumphal
procession with throngs crowding tIc streets to welcome tIc
conquering liero, Essex slipped into London, unannounced, and with
few aftendants. (57)
Thus, a certain on-going dialogue between the Court and Shakespeare can be
discemed. On the one hand, the queen clearly influenced Shakespeare’s output— her
urging the bard to show falstaff in love one more time is but one example, on the
other hand, Shakespeare scems no matter how implicitly and indirectly, to influence
the queen’s strategies. This play can be seen as the equivalent of Madhiavelli’s The
Prince and can eam the bard the titie of tIc better Madhiavelli.
Thus, in this first part of my thesis, I situated Shakespereare’s Herny V in
relation to two radically different Renaissance models of kingship, namely the
Christian model and the Madhiavellian one. Through juxtaposing Madhiavelli’s The
Prince, Erasmus’s Education of a Christian Prince, and Shakespeare’s Herny I’Ç I
sliowed how Henry V is ratIer an ideal Machiavellian king, were it only for lis
successful masquerading as a Christian king. It is this Machiavellian dliaracter of the
king that I examine, in the second part of my dhapter. In this part, I underscore the
importance of Shakespeare’s Hemy V not only as a work that presents the reader/
spectator with an ideal Englïsh king relying on Madhiavellian strategies to achieve
national unity, but also as a key element in a proto-Cultural Ideological State
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Apparatus trying, itself, to achieve national unity (Aithusser TS 1489). lndeed,
Shakespeare presents Henry V as an ideal Machiavellian prince abiding faitlifuily by
the mies of the Italian mentor to unite an Engiand that was disintegrating. Henry V
owes the success of his national project to bis forging a national army with which lie
wages his war against france, thus tuming away ail dissension and hatred of his
people towards a common national enemy. I also examined his cunning reliance on
the religious discourse to legitimize his war. In the third part ofmy chapter, I focused
on the bard’s play as an ideological weapon trying to achieve the very goal we see
Henry achieving by the end of the play, nameiy national unity and stability. Among
the strategies to which Shakespeare resorts, in this regard, I may refer to the distortion
ofhistorical facts. In addition, I have examined the way Shakespeare’s text, mainiy
the chorus interventions, work in a way that is akin to the way ideology works, in the
sense that both present spectators and subjects respectively with an imaginary relation
to the conditions oftheir existence.
Through juxtaposing historical accounts of the potential real counterparts of
the cliaracters we cross in the play, the play itseif and Machiavelii’s The Prince, in
the last part of my chapter, I have come to the conclusion that Henry V can be taken
as a letter from Shakespeare to queen Eiizabeth, the way The Prince was “a letter
from Niccolo Machiavelli to the Magnificent Lorenzo de Medici” (Machiavelli 3).
The only difference is that Shakespeare delivers his Machiavellian message to the
queen subtly, as I have shown.
Chapter II
Otivier’s Sanitized Adaptation of Shakespeare’s Henry V: The Use of
Shakespeare for Propaganda Purposes
During the Second World War
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Tn my first chapter, I referred to two major groups of critics who marked the
history of criticism of Shakespeare’s Herny V. While the first group sees the play’s
eponymous hero, in Manichaean ternis, either as a duck or as a rabbit, the second
juxtaposes both sides ofthe king. Then, tbrough establishing an intertextual dialogue
between the bard’s play and Niccolô Machiavelli’s The Prince, I managed to show
that the seemingly Christian side of the king is a sine qua non for his success as a
Machiavellian prince. My analysis of the play so far has concemed itself solely with
the historical and political circumstances under which it was produced in Elizabethan
England. However, this way of approaching Shakespeare’s work, as if it were sealed
off in sixteenth-century England fails short of doing justice to what Holdemess cails
“the real Shakespeare” (VS 93). The “real Shakespeare” is “an enormously complex
system of refracting prisms: the whole multifarious body of ideas, attitudes,
assumptions, images, which have accmed over centuries of cultural activity centered
on the literary productions of this Elizabethan dramatist” (Holdemess VS 93). This
cultural materialist approach to the study of Shakespeare does flot confine itselfto the
historical moment that saw the production of the work in question, the way new
historicists do.7 Rather, it seeks to examine the bard’s play and its subsequent
productions through a wide range of media. Tbrough juxtaposing and examining a
Shakespearean play and a twentieth-century cinematographic adaptation of it, this
cuiturai materialist approach also tries to understand the present. This is what Ivo
Kamps emphasizes, when he says, “a pivotai and oflen recognized difference between
American New Historicist and British Cultural Materialist practice is the latter’s more
Hayden White points this out, when he says: “it is now the “synchronic” rather than the
“diachronic”aspects ofthe relationship between literamre and the “cultural system” that become the
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pressing interest in the ‘uses to which an historical present puts its own version ofthe
Englisli past” (6). Adopting this cultural materialist perspective, I will examine the
way Olivier’s cinematographic adaptation of Shakespeare’s Hem-y V (1944) flrnctions
as a brilliant propaganda masterpiece in the Second World War “Cultural Ideological
State Apparatus” (Aithusser TS 1489). In this chapter, I will examine the
circumstances surrounding the production of Olivier’s Hemy V and the way its status
as a feature film supported by the Ministry of Information (MOI) shapes the
propaganda message it delivers. Then, I will consider the film proper and examine
the strategies resorted to by Olivier in his mission to boost the morale of the English
people and their allies. More precisely, I will explore the useflulness of Shakespeare’s
play for propaganda purposes, as well as what lias to be sacrificed in order to yield a
movie presenting the viewer with “a rabbit,” deleting every single trace of the “duck”
we could have perceived in the play (Rabkin 246).
The Ministry of Information (MOI), commonly known among British people
as the Ministry ofDisinformation, was founded in 1936 when the Second World War
was looming in the distance. Its mission consisted mainly in “present[ing] the
national case to the public at home and abroad in time of war” (Chapman 16).
Though, at the beginning of the Second World War, the MOI failed to fulfili its duty,
it kept on improving throughout the war to reach its apex in 1944, with the release of
Olivier’s Heniy V—a film it supported from start to finish. This is evidenced by the
fact that the Agincourt sequence is filmed in Eire, something Olivier could not have
done without the approval of the govemment and the intervention of the MOI
(Chapman 244). Here, I want to go back to a key phrase in Chapman’s conception of
prefened focus ofthe New Flistoricists’ attention” (293).
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the mission of the MOI, nameiy “national case,” and see, taking into account the
history of the MOI and the different policies it adopted, whether the word national
actually means national, i.e. representing ail parties in the nation, or rather sectional.
During the early years oftlie Second World War, the MOI did not have a clear
policy, nor did it have a constant favorite among the two major trends of film
making, namely documentary and feature fiim-making. However, as of 1940, the
Program for Film Propaganda, as conceived by Sir Keimeth Ciark, isolated the lefiist
documentary fiim-makers who were bent on “further[ingj the cause of social reform,”
even during the war (Chapman 52). In fact, they were confined to making
documentaries about “how Britain fights” (Chapman 54)8 They were craftily made
to tum their attention from social issues underlining social inequity and discontent to
covering the following list of themes: the British war effort, ail the fighting services,
and subsidiary services, i.e. merchant navy, munitions, shïpbuilding, coastal
command, and fishermen (Chapman 54). Furthermore, the MOI did not oflen
interfere when documentary fiim-makers were called upon to serve in the military
war effort. Ibis is what Cliapman underlines, wlien lie says:
{t]hey also felt that for most of the war they were fighting a rearguard
action against a govemment which did not place sufficient value on
their skills and expertise. for instance, in defending documentary
fiim-makers against call-up by the Ministry of Labor and National
Service in 1941, Documentai-y News Letter argued that documentary
personnel were more valuable to the war effort in their present
capacity. (51)
8
“The themes outlined by Clark—’What Bntain is fighting for’, ‘How Bntain fights’ and ‘The need
for sacrifice if the fight is to be won’ were based on a Policy Committee paper wntten in December
1939 by Lord Macmillan.” (26) The above-mentioned program refers to Clark’s ‘Progamme for Film
Propaganda’, which lie “presented” as a “paper... to the Co-Ordinating Committee ofthe v1O1”
(Chapman 26)
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Bearing this in mmd, we can see in the fact that Olivier “had to be persuaded by the
Mïnïstry of Information to abandon his duties in the Fleet Air Arm,” when he was
going to star in lis Herny V a clear attempt to isolate the lefiist documentary film
makers (Holdemess 102). This isolation of the latter is accounted for by the fact that
they would flot promote the glorious image of the nation the MOI wants them to
promote. In fact, among the films documentary fiim-makers produced, I may refer to
Housing Problems (1935) and Enough to Eat (1936), which “highlighted the
problems of sium housing and poor nutrition among the British working classes”
(Chapman 52). This was the kind of films the documentary film-makers intended to
make even during the war, which explains their restriction by the MOI to the definite
task of covering the war effort.
As far as the crucial question “Wbat Britain is fightïng for” is concemed,
another major question in Sïr Kenneth CÏark’s above-mentioned program, it was Îeft
for feature fiim-makers to tackie (Chapman 26). Here, it becomes obvious that the
national case the MOI is supposed to present is simply sectional (Chapman 16). The
national case the MOI is supposed to present through wartime films is, thus, revealed
to be sectional, as the Ministry’s discriminatory treatment of feature fiim-makers and
documentary film-makers privileges the version the former provide. It wants to keep
the status quo, which serves the interests of those who are already in power, along
with those who hold privileged positions, such as the trade press and commercial
fiim-makers. Holdemess refers to this, when he says:
[a]t this point ‘Shakespeare,’ as the visible, concrete embodiment
(literature) ofa lost social harmony, was brought into direct complicity
with that ideology of national unity which the leading sections of
Bntish society—govemment, press and broadcasting media, trades
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union leadership—were fighting to forge and perpetuate throughout
the war. (96)
Thïs explains, to a large extent, why Clark’s Program is “more inclined to the
viewpoint of the trade press” than to that of the documentary movement (Chapman
55). Likewise, the similar views and common interests of the MOI and the war
government, on the one hand, and the trade press and commercial feature film
makers, on the other hand, explains the MOI’s reliance on feature fiim-makers to
present their sectional interests as national interests. Emphasizing the greater
entertainment value of feature film, when compared with that of documentary films,
Kenneth Clark’s program “was more inclined to the viewpoint ofthe trade press [and
consequently of feature fiim-makers] than the documentary movement” (Chapman
55). It also explains why the MOI saw “that feature films were the best medium for
the presentation of ‘what Britain is fighting for” (Chapman 53). Chapman points
this out, when he says:
[t]he film being a popular medium must be good entertainment if it is
to be good propaganda. A film which induces boredom antagonizes
the audience to the cause which it advocates. For this reason, an
amusing American film with a few hits at the Nazi regime is probably
better propaganda than any number of documentaries showing the
making ofbullets. (55)
Again, the topics that are to be covered, by feature film-makers, are highly selective
and aim, as any propaganda, to present the object in question in the best of lights. A
clear emphasis is put on presenting such British ideals as “freedom,” “the history of
British liberty,” and the use of historical parallels (Chapman 54). Olivier’s Herny V
is one ofthe most famous feature films produced along these lines. His film flot only
aims at boosting the morale of the British by showing them that their ancestors once
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did defeat a stronger enemy, but also by projecting a romantic picture of the ideal
English nation— a nation characterized by its unity and cohesion. Olivier’s Herny V
(1944) was, by no means, the only wartime propaganda film that drew its inspiration
from the English heritage to boost the morale of the British. Among these, I will
refer to This England (1941), The Young Mr. Pitt (1942), and A Canterbwy Tale
(1944). However, the special status of Hemy V, among wartime British propaganda
films, can 5e explained by its “great popular success” (Chapman 245). It is worth
noting, however, that this ideal picture of the English nation is a mere constmct.
Indeed, as Baucom contends, “nationalist discourse, as Benedict Anderson suggests,
expresses a will to synchronic and diachronie coincidences of identity, a will to
homogenize the present by submitting it to the sovereignty of the past” (4).
Here, a question begs to be asked: what are the reasons that may have led to
the exclusion of the documentary film-makers from the above-mentioned propaganda
field, reserved for the partisan feature fiim-makers? At the beginning, we miglit 5e
tempted to attribute their exclusion to the fact that feature films, which evolve around
a narrative, are Setter suited to teil the story of the glorious wars waged by the ideal
English king Henry V, for instance. Chapman talks about this, when lie says:
{d]ocumentary, as an essentially factual mode of film practice, was
therefore flot regarded as a good form for dramatizing stories of
Britisli institutions and ideas of liberty [...] However, the factual
nature of documentary made it more appropriate for the presentation
of’How Bntain fights.’ (54)
In addition to their greater entertainment value, feature films have the ment of
addressing a broader audience. However, when we look at a book like The New
Fropaganda, written by the Marxist writer Amber Blanco White in 1939, which
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outiines the lefi-wing conception of propaganda adopted by the documentary film
makers, we reach a far more satisfactory answer.9 In fact, White argued that lefi
wing propaganda in democracy should be based on promoting social change: “[w]e
want the electorate to feel, and feel passionately, that they deserve a better order than
the present social system and are prepared to make sacrifices in order to get it”
(Chapman 53). Upon reading this key principle by which documentary fiim-makers
abide, we can easily understand why they were confined to the production of factual
movies presenting the British war effort. Feature fiim-makers, like Olivier, go back to
the glorious English past and get their inspiration from Shakespeare, who “in many
ways lias corne to stand for England’s past greatness” (Howard 9), to present the
viewer with an ideal picture of the English as a “band ofbrothers” (IV. 3. 291). In
contrast, documentary fiim-makers would flot only foreground their vision of the
better social system the English people deserve, but also point out what is wrong with
the present social system (Chapman 53). In this sense, we can guess that the content
of their wartirne movies would be akin to the content of such books as the one written
by Angus Calder on British society during World War Il. Calder is among the many
historians who question the rnyth of a People’s War, and “his evidence and arguments
emphasize the discontent as well as the heroisrn, the persistence of social divisions
and conflicts from the I 930’s” (Holdemess VS 96). This concem of documentary
fiim-makers with “dissent,” “social divisions and conflicts,” and their advocacy of
social change certainly lcd to their being “left out in the cold by the MOI” (Chaprnan
51) and their being confined to responding to the question “How Britain fights”
Though I do flot daim that White is the spokesman ofdocumentary fiim-makers, the relevance ofhis
quote stems from the affmity between the ideas he expresses in his above-mentioned book and those
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(Chapman 53). This ideologically significant discriminatory attitude of the MOI
towards documentary fiim-makers and the grounds on which this discrimination is
premised anticipates the ideas and the propaganda message we will be getting from
such a feature-fiim as Olivier’s Hemy V.
Here, I intend to examine the strategies to which Olivier resorts in bis mission
to boost the morale of the English people and the allies, concentrating mainly on what
makes it possible to invest the cultural capital of the bard for propaganda purposes. I
will also consider the importance of the deletion and distortion of certain scenes from
$hakespeare’s play to Olivier’s presenting the viewer with a positive and heroic
picture of Henry V. To put it in Howard’s words, I want to highlight what Olivier
muted to produce the “celebratory and sanitized version of the play” we get in the
movie (7).
Being a feature film that uses the “historical parallels” suggested by the MOI
and relying on the cultural capital of the English bard, Olivier’s Hem-y V is
considered to 5e among the most ccprestigious British feature films” (Chapman 54).
Critics like Graham Holdemess, Jean E. Howard, and Anthony Davies agree that
Olivier’s adaptation of Shakespeare’s Hem-y V was produced with a view to boosting
the morale of the English and their allies. “Enlist[ing] the cultural authority of
Shakespeare in the Allied cause” reflects the status of Shakespeare as a “British
cultural icon” (Howard 7). Indeed, Shakespeare’s work and name have simply corne
to be associated with an ideal picture of a prosperous and glorious England, as well as
with an ideal conception of Englishness. Nonetheless, what is worth noting, here, is
that the use of Shakespeare’s authonty seems to 5e almost totally divorced frorn a full
by which documentary fiim-makers abide.
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grasp of the Shakespearean material in question. Thïs is pointed out by Graham
Holdemess, wlien he taiks about the speech John of Gaunt delivers in the first Act of
the second scene of Richard II, saying that “certainly outside the play his famous
patriotic speech lias invariably been employed to endorse absolute authority, to
support Ilie autocratic will of many subsequent Britisli kings and governments”
(WIMN 221). However, if we see the speech in its textual context, we become aware
of the fact that it is “[a] diatribe of criticism against the ruling monarch: Gaunt is not
even depicting the England of the present, but expressing a nostaigic regret for an
England which has long since vanished into the historical past” (Holderness
WIMN221). Olivier’s adaptation of Heniy V seems to be doing exactly the same
thing to the bard’s play. Indeed, his film takes the aspects relating Henry V to the
model of the ideal Christian king and amplifies them. It also deletes ail the scenes
that cast the king in the role of tlie Machiavellian prince par excellence. 11e use of
these strategies allows Olivier to present his viewers among tlie English and the allies
with amoral and heroic “Churchullian” commander (Holdemess VS 102).
The presentation of the English king! commander wlio is portrayed by Olivier,
who places him “in the frame next to tlie flag of St. George,” during the Battie of
Agincourt, as “a powerful signifier of Englishness” is contrasted wïth the snobbish
Frencli, mainly the Dauphin (Chapman 246).’° Here, it is worth noting that this
concept of Englishness, like that of the ideal Englisli nation, is a construct. In fact, as
Baucom puts it:
[f]or the identifications of Englishness witli tlie locale—and witli the
local knowledges, local dialects, local traditions, and local memories
that are held to emerge from the locale—would have forced many self-
50
appointed defenders of an authentic, pure, and settled way of being
English to address a sufficiently complex set of problems (of canon
formation and preservation, of determining which of England’s many
localities were most English, of deflning their perfect moment, of
definitively differentiating them from their corrupting neighbors, of
guarding them against the vicissitudes ofhistory).” (5)
Moreover, the portrait we get of the french can also be taken as allegoricaily
applying to the Nazis and the ruthlessness they stood for in the minds of the British
during the Second World War. In this part of my chapter, I intend to explore the
strategies Olivier uses to boost the morale of the English and their allies through an
examination of his transformation of a Machiavellian prince into a moral and heroic
“powerflul signifier of Englishness” (Chapman 246). I will also examine his negative
depiction of the french and the constant parallels Olivier draws throughout his movie
between Henry’s war on France and Britain and the allies’ war on Nazi Germany,
suggesting that the English can win again.
In order to tum Shakespeare’s Henry V who, as I have shown in my first
chapter can be taken as an exemplum of the Machiavellian prince, into a model
Christian king, Olivier has to sacrifice a lot ofkey scenes. In fact, ail those elements
and scenes in the play hinting at the Machiaveilian side of the king, or having the
potential to tamish lis portrait are either deleted or distorted. Among these I may
refer to Henry’s Harfieur speech and his order to kiil the French prisoners when he
knew that the French reinforced their ranks. The deletion of the Harfleur speech not
only aÏlow Olivier to portray the frencli and their metaphorical counterparts, the
Nazis, as savage, mthless, and blood-thirsty soldiers, but also gives us the impression
that the virtuous English king does flot even think of inflicting such a violence, as lie
did flot even threaten to use it. Had Henry V been filmed delivering the following
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unes: “And the fieshed soldier, rough and hard of heart, / In liberty of bloody hand
shah range! With conscience wide as heu, mowing like grass/ Your fresli fair virgins
and your fiowering infants,” it would have been less likely for the viewers to have a
positive attitude towards him (III. 3. 216). Thus, one can see that Olivier had to
delete these two scenes to make Henry V a “signifier of Englishness” worthy of that
name, and to meet the expectations of an audience whose knowledge of
Shakespeare’s Henry V was already framed by Dallas Bower, the pioneer television
producer (Chapman 246). In 1942, Bower presented a wartime radio program entitled
“Into Battle,” which aimed at boosting the morale of the English troops (Chapman
244). This program featured Olivier reciting Henry’s “Once more into the breach”
(III. 1. 201) and “Crispin’s Day” speeches (Chapman 244). This imphies that, to a
large extent, British radio listeners had already a good idea of Henry V. With its
deletions, Olivier’s movie serves only to fiirther anchor that positive image of Henry
V in the minds ofBritish viewers.
The other scene strategically omitted by Olivier is the one about the
Southampton plot. This scene is probably the most dangerous of ail, as it puts the
legitimacy of the king into question. As I have shown in my first chapter, even
Shakespeare does flot teil us about the dynastic motives of Cambridge, nor does he
teil us about the existence of an even more legitimate claimant to the English throne,
namely the Earl of March. Taking bis cue from Shakespeare and aware of the fact
that incorporating such a scene in his film would be detrimental to the popularity and
positive portrait he wants to give us of Henry V, Olivier opts for omitting the
Southampton plot from bis movie.
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The other strategy to which Olivier resorts in lis film to produce “a
celebrating and sanitized version of the play” is distortion (Howard 7). This can be
seen at work, for instance, in Olivier’s choice to film the conspiracy scene between
the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Ely, as well as the tortuous legalistic
legitimization of Henry V’s daim to the French throne as a farce. lndeed, the
documents that are supposed to back up the Ardhbishop’s demonstration are scattered
by the angry Bishop on the stage, which causes the laughter of the Elizabethan
audience. What makes the scenes ail the more farcical is that the Archbishop who
waiks on a stage bestrewn with historical documents has to rely on the bishop’s
haphazard and clownïsh picking of documents. This farcical treatment of the scene
distracts the audience’s attention from Henry’s Machiavellian sdheme. However,
reading the corresponding scenes in Shakespeare’s play, one cannot help but be aware
of the king’s calculations. Indeed, the king makes it known that le intends to
implement a Iaw that would make the bishops “lose the better haif of their
possession” (I. 1.123). At the same time, the bishops leam ofthe king’s intention to
wage a war on France, and that if they do flot support it, the law Hemy V threatens to
implement will simply be implemented. The implications ofthese scenes, namely the
unjustness of Henry’s war, as well as lis ciear Madhiavellian character are iost on the
viewer, as they are played in a ciownish fashion. The film viewers are also incited
not to be bothered by the scenes, and join in the iaughter ofthe Globe audience at the
beginning of the movie. The way Olivier deals with this scene again enables him to
cleanse his film from the Machiavellian aspect of the king, thus enabling him to
consolidate the positive portrait of a virtuous, Christian Henry V.
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Distorting the scene with the bishops and omitting such scenes as the
threatening Harfleur speech, Henry’s order to kili the French soldiers, and the
Southampton plot make us see that Olivier’s film operates in a way that reminds us of
the way the above-mentioned John of Gaunt’s speech works. In fact, in order to
make bis movie work as propaganda, and to present the English commander in a
positive and heroic light, Olivier has to do away with so much ofthe play. Here, one
can’t help but remember Rabkin’s conclusion that “simply by juxtaposing the two
readings, I have shown that each of them, persuasive as it is, is reductive, requiring
that we exciude too much to hold it” (260).
However, Oiivier’s farcicai treatment of the scene with the clergymen cannot
be accounted for solely by the director’s intention to present Henry V in a positive
light. Indeed, a full understanding of the comic aspect Olivier gives the scene can be
reached through an examination of one of the major principles of the MOI, nameiy
their insistence on the importance of avoiding “direct propaganda” (Chapman 46), as
well as the fusion of propaganda and entertainment in film. P. C. Mannock puts this
succinctly when he says that “if the history of screen propaganda telis us anything at
ail, it telis us that the less blatant it is, the more effective the resuit. 11e one guide, of
course, is that of genuine entertainment, in which anything can be put over”
(Chapman 49). Mannock summarizes an important shifi in the MOI policy during the
pivotai year 1943. In fact, the Films Division ofthe MOI declared that it wanted high
quality entertainment films (Chapman $0). This shifi in the poiicy of the MOI came
as a response to the film viewers’ resentment of direct propaganda and war films. As
the Second World War went on, British people increasingly adopted an escapist
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attitude. This means that when they went to the movies they wanted to forget about
the atrocities and bleak realities of the war they were living.” Filming the scene with
the clergymen as farce, thus, allows Olivier to respond to the taste of bis potential
viewers, as welI as to their need for something entertaining and amusing, something
that makes them forget even temporarily the grim face ofwar.
Had Olivier opted for giving this scene the sad aspect Branagh gave it, it
would have been really difficult for his movie to succeed as propaganda. Indeed,
Branagh does flot blame the war Ofi Henry, who is, according to him, a
“genuinely holy man” (Hatchuel 4$). This explains why lie films the above
mentioned scene as a conspiracy of the clergy and the nobility, who want to lead
Henry to wage the war on France. In the Branagli adaptation, this conspiracy can 5e
discemed in the signal Exeter gives the archbishop of Canterbury prompting the latter
to the conclusion that Henry’s war is just. The grim and tense atmosphere marking
the “establishing scene” (Weiss 63) mainly the private conversation of the Bishop and
the Archbishop would have certainly reminded the British wartime viewer of war
spies and intelligence services, A similar treatment of the scene with the clergymen
would have only won the resentment of the war audience who “go to the cinema,
[and].. . expect to be arnused and distracted from everyday life, and ... leave worries
behind for two or three hours” (Chapman 46). This gives us a fuller understanding of
Olivier’s choice to film the second scene ofthe first Act in a farcical fashion.
This is pointed ont by Chapman, when he says, “ There is a feeling that when you go to the cinema,
you expect to be amused and distracted from everyday life, and you leave worries behind oftwo or
three hours. 1f while you are in that mood, someone on the screen lectures at you, you are inclined to
resent it” (46).
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furthermore, another strategy that seems to have heiped Olivier in bis
cleansing of Henry V’s portrait audience consists in his relegation of such a scene as
the justification of the war to the first part of the movie which cornes in the fonn of a
reconstruction of an Elizabethan stage performance of Shakespeare’s Herny V. In
fact, not oniy is it played as farce, but it is also denied the realistic treatrnent it would
have received had it not been filmed as a theatrical performance. It is worth noting,
here, that the scenes with which viewers tend to associate the movie are those
portraying the glorious battie of Agincourt through the use of the cinematic medium
with ail its reaiistic effects. Holdemess, in his study of Olivier’s film, enumerates
these scenes, in the foliowing passage:
[t]hose scenes of the film which seem to have made the maximum
impact and to have lingered most strongiy in the popuiar imagination
are those which belong to its patriotic application of the play to the
current national crisis: Henry’s Churchuilian speeches before Harfieur
and Agincourt (clearly recalling the mood of 1940); the inserted baille
scenes, fiimed with ail the resources of modem film technology—
depicting what Shakespeare’s chorus despaired of depicting: the
colorful panoply of chivalry, the glamour of historical pageant, the
thrill ofvictory; the confident militaristic emotions of 1944. (vs 102)
The special impact ofthese scenes can be explained by two major factors. First, these
scenes are of immediate relevance to the British viewers who were fighting World
War II, which was also pointed out by Davies (27).
Olivier cleariy explores the plausible historical parallelism between Henry V’s
England and England in 1943-4 to fulfiIl bis mission ofboosting the morale ofthe
British and their allies. This parallelism is foregrounded by James Chapman: “Henry
V was released in the autumn of 1944, and its stirring account of an English army
crossing the channel and routing a continental adversary had obvious contemporary
56
parallels in the afiermath of D-Day” (245). Drawing this parallel between the
situation of Second World War Britain and a similar situation drawn from the
glorious past of “this scepter’d isle” secms to make good use of the viewers’
association of that glorious past with the ideal state of the English nation; a past for
which they are nostalgic (II. 1. 40).
What is important to note, here, is that the chosen episode from the glorious
past ends with the totally unexpected victory of the English over their miglitier foes.
Bearing in mmd the associations British people are prone to make between Henry’s
war on France and the allies war on Germany, Olivier subtly presents the French
allegorically as the Nazi foes. This can be seen mainly through lis depiction of the
military might and superior numbers of the Frencli. Indeed, the scene preceding the
Battle of Agincourt shows the French nobility mounted on their horses. One striking
detail in this scene is the huge armor of the French, which makes it necessary for
them to be mounted on their horses by means of drills. This detail would not fail to
remind the wartime British viewer of the “Nazi war machine,” as Chapman puts it
(246). The heaviness of German weaponry is conveyed through the heavy armors of
the French knights. Tndeed, their armor is so heavy that the knights have to be placed
on their horses by means of drills. Furthermore, the ruthlessness with which the Nazi
character is associated in the minds of the British is rendered vividly through the
filming of the atrocious act of the killing the luggage boys, carried out by the French.
The scene with the children slaughtered and drowned in their blood evokes the
massacres the Nazis were capable ofundertaking.
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Moreover, Olivier suggests the Second World War implicitly through an
allegorical representation of the non-English components of Henry’s army, namely
the Welsh, Irish and Scottish captains, as allies. Unlike Branagh, who makes the non
Englisli captains “speak English in the native garb,” Olivier stresses their belonging
to different regions both through their different accents and the emblems embroidered
on their costumes (V. 1. 342). for instance, the Irishman has St. Patrick’s cloverleaf,
the Scottish captain a thistie, and the Welshman the picture of the famous leak.
Taken in the context of World War II, and taking into account the fact that
propaganda movies were produced to boost the morale not only of the English but
also of their allies, Olivier’s emphasizing the different components of the English
anny can possibly be consïdered as an implicit hint at Britain’s allies, namely France
and the United States. In this sense, we can see the victoiy scored by the English,
when united with the Irish, Welsh, and Scottish, as allegorically projecting a potential
victory of Britain and its allies over the Nazis. lndeed, it is basically by appealing to
Shakespeare’s English past, maïnly through the incorporation of the reconstruction of
the Elizabethan stage performance at the beginning of the film, that Olivier assures
the British of a potential victory over the German, Put bluntly, the message Olivier
wants to communicate is that the British can defeat their mightier German enemy, the
way their ancestors defeated the bigger french army.
The victory of the British and their allies is made to appear immanent not only
through the defeat of the French in the movie, but also through the depiction of the
french—the allegorical counterparts of the Nazis—in such a way as to make their
defeat inevitable. Likewise, the chances of the potential victory of the Britisli and
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tlieir allies are enhanced by portraying them as having ail tlie virtues the french iack.
Here, in order to achieve this, Olivier takes a lot of historical license. This can be
seen at work througliout the movie. From the very flrst scene in which we encounter
the French in the royal court, Olivier seems bent on depicting them in the most
negative of lights. This scene show us the arrogance of the Dauphin, who belitties the
Engiish king, when lie says: “for, my good liege, she is so idiy kinged,! Her sceptre
so fantastically borne! By a vain, giddy, slialiow, humorous youtli,/ That fear attends
lier not” (II. 4. 189). It aiso foregrounds the discord and disunity among the ranks of
the frencli in ail the scenes that bring together the Dauphin and the nobility. The
scene filmed in the tent on the eve oftlie battle ofAgincourt conveys the lack ofunity
between the Frencli Dauphin and lis nobles in various ways. Even before we
consider what they say, the isolation of the Dauphin is made clear through the
singular posture lie takes. Jndeed, whule ail the nobles are sitting around the table, lie
is sliown to be standing apart from them. By the same token, the unity of tlie nobiiity,
whidli is implicitly communicated through their adoption of the same physical
posture—sitting around the same table—is confirmed through their clear despising of
tlie Dauphin. This attitude of the nobility towards the Dauphin, whidli Shakespeare
himself conveyed through the words tIc noble men say, is accentuated by the
expressions of contempt and mockery we can read on their faces in Olivier’s movie.
Througl this depiction of the Frendli, Olivier tries to allegorically project a negative
picture of a defeatable Nazi foe. However, were we to go back to historical accounts
of the Nazis, we would discover a totally different picture. In fact, the Nazis were
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rather known for their unity and the cohesion of their ranks. The description of a
major component ofthe Nazi military machine, namely the
Wehrmacht, the strongest spot of the German military machine was its
frontiine men, both officers and soldiers is insightful. As many recent
studies have demonstrated, in comparison with its opponents,
throughout most of the war the Wehrmacht had, by and large, a
superior morale and unit cohesion. (Dziewanowiski 353)
Though this quote does flot give us an idea about the state ofthe whole German army,
its description of the cohesion characterizing one of its key units cannot fail to remind
us of the license Olivier takes with history. Likewise, it does flot fail to evoke the
nickname the MOI eamed at the beginning of the Second World War, the “Ministry
ofDisinformation” (Chapman 40).
Another major subtie element in Olivier’s negative portrayal of the French
consïsts in the fact that most backgrounds of the French scenes are inspired from the
two-dimensional medieval paintings of the Duke of Berry’s Book ofHours. These
two-dimensionaÏ paintings are characterized by their flat backgrounds, which give the
viewer no feeling of perspective. This lack of perspective characterizing most french
scenes can be taken as a metaphorical hint at the shallowness ofthe French. The first
scene that introduces the viewer to the French court is a perfect illustration of this.
Most Englïsh scenes, on the other hand, are scarcely filmed with the fixed two
dimensional pictures from the Book ofHours, to guarantee the positive depiction of
the English. To further reinforce his negative depiction of the French, Olivier opts
for a music with a very slow rhythm for the first French court scene. This music is
clearly contrasted with the crescendo accompanying the landing of the English
soldiers on french sou. The strength of the latter is forcefiilly communicated through
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the fact that the viewer is simultaneously presented with an angry wave and a herd of
Englisli soldiers moving, with the same resolve and strength, towards the French
shores.
But, we can safely say that through this strategy Olivïer’s goal to boost the
morale of the English can be seen as fulfilled, mainly when we take into account the
glorious picture lie gives us ofthe “band of English brothers” (W. 3. 291). In this
respect, the Englisli are portrayed as the opposite of the French as far as the unity and
cohesion oftheir ranks are concemed. Indeed, while the arrogant French nobility and
the Dauphin are not shown even once in touch with their soldiers, Henry V is shown
touring his camp, taiking to his soldiers and doing his best to encourage them. On the
rhetorical level, the unity, equality, and brotherhood among the English and their
allies are communicated through Olivier’s Churchullian delivery of the St. Crispin’s
speech.
Thus, I underlined different aspects that made of Olivier’s propaganda movie
a major success. Ibis success underlines, on the one hand, Olïvier’s prowess as
director and actor, and the maturing of the MOI and its policies, on the other hand.
Indeed, with Herny V, the MOI seems to have reached its apotheosis. Nowhere can
we find a trace of those blunders that characterized its early years. Indeed, unlike
many of those feature films, released at the beginning of the war—which are marked
by the bluntness oftheir propaganda message—Olivier’s movie subtly fulfills its duty
as propaganda. When we watch the movie with the history of the MOI in mmd, we
are well aware of the fact that the time of the “old-fashioned thriller[s] incorporating
odd irrelevant lines of dialogue about freedom, persecution, fascïsm” is over
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(Chapman 52). Rather, the propaganda message of Henry V is filtered through
Olivier’s crafty use of the authority of Shakespeare, as well as through his implicit
drawing of parallels between the glorious past of medieval England and Britain in
1943-4.
This parallelism and the stunning success of Olivier’s film depend on omitting
a lot of aspects that are incompatible with the propaganda message the MOI wants to
communicate to the masses. Here, Olivier’s Henîy V fimctions in a way similar to
the way ideology works. In my first chapter, I showed how $hakespeare’s play
works the way ideology does. As far as Olivier’s movie is concemed, the work it
performs, as ideology, is far more difficuit to discem, as it goes beyond the movie per
se. Indeed, understanding the ideological task a film like Olivier’s Herny V performs
depends on seeing it as part ofthe bigger ideological British war machine, namely the
MOI and its Films Division.
Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield’s definition of ideology as “composed
ofthose beliefs, practices and institutions which work to legitimate the social order—
especially by the process ofrepresenting sectional or class interests as universal ones”
is a good summary ofwhat Olivier’s Heniy V, as part ofthe MOI, does (HI 215). In
fact, the special status of this trend of fiim-making under which Olivier’s movie can
be classified, as well as the isolation of the lefiist documentary film-makers make of
the national case, the MOI is supposed to represent, a rather sectional one. Being
supported by the MOI, which is part ofthe govemment, the film depicts the interests
ofthe govemment as national, and its view ofthings as universal.
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This is reflected, first, as I noted earlier, through the isolation of the lefiist
documentary fiim-makers which means that their way of perceiving the national case
is flot given voice. This silencing ofone party in the fiim-making industry because of
its concem for “social progress,” and the representation of the national case the
prerogative ofthe feature flim-makers who share the concems, views, and interests of
the govemment means that any feature film sponsored by the MOI inevitably
represents the government interests, to a large extent (Chapman 52). That is to say, it
represents sectional interests as national. Consequently, the much celebrated promise
of equity and brotherhood, which is at the heart of the St. Crispin speech, remains a
mere promise to make the British “fight cheerfully” (IV. 1. 269).
Here, one is reminded of a controversial issue that was raised at the beginning
of the Second World War in Britain around the compatibility of propaganda and the
democratic nature of Britain—as opposed to the fascist German regime, for instance.
According to Frederick Barlett, a major distinction between the propaganda of
dictatorship and that of democracy consists in the fact that the latter acknowledges the
existence of different shades of opinion, which of course can neyer be allowed in the
dictator states (Chapman 44). The ideologically significant process of selection that
led to the empowerment of feature fiim-makers at the expense of documentary film
makers and the sanitization ofthe bard’s play Olivier undertakes allow us to classif,’
the film under Bartlett’s category of the propaganda of dictatorship. In fact, the
MOI’s exclusion of the documentary “different shade of opinion” (Chapman 44) and
its fostering feature film-making, on the one hand, and Olivier’s effacing of ail the
traces of a potential “duck” and presenting the viewer only with a “rabbit” (Rabkin
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246), on the other hand, lend support to classifying the film under the propaganda of
dictatorship, rather than that ofdemocracy.
Here, it is worth noting that although critics like Davies and Chapman do flot
miss the striking paraliels between Olivier’s Heniy V and Eisenstein’s Atexander
Nevsky, none of them goes so far as to explore the implications of the fact that
Eisenstein’s movie was the product of the propaganda machine of the Stalinist
dictatorship. Cubitt points out the category of propaganda under which Nevsky can
be classified, when lie says:
[i]t is not an ‘Eisenstein’ film, product of genius, but a film by a
master crafisman shot under the discipline of Soviet realism and
subordinated to the propaganda aims of Stalïn’s state bureaucracy... It
is so compromised by its production under conditions of systemic
duress. (102)
The common point Davies and Chapman discem between Nevsky and Hemy V is
maïnly the resembiance between the battie of Agincourt in the latter and the battle of
Ice in the former. However, they miss a far clearer and more fundamental
resemblance consisting in the fact that both films can be classified under what Cubitt
calis “total film.” The latter defines total film as follows:
[wjhat these films share is the attempt to deploy maximal rhetorical
control over cinematic effects, removing the extraneous and filling the
aurai and visual wavebands of the film with a single theme, so
minimizing the possibility of the audience creating its own meanings,
becoming distracted, or missing the point ofthe film. (101)
The concept of total film is very close to the definition Bartlett gives of the
propaganda produced in dictatorships, Cubitt actually notes that “total film is by no
means the exclusive property of Stalinism” (101). The preceding definition of total
film undermines ail those statements British propagandisis made about the radically
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different nature ofpropaganda in a democracy, at the beginning ofthe Second World
War. This definition seems to be an adequate description of what Olivier does in his
Herny V. In fact, the duality of the Shakespearean character pointed out by Rabkin
and Deats is “extraneous” and the “aurai and visual wavebands ofthe film” are fiiled
with a single meaning that serves the purposes ofthe govemment (Cubitt 101). What
Olivier does to the optical garne so much cherished by Rabkin ïs to irrevocably fix its
pararneters to the picture of the rabbit, for instance. The rabbit, here, would
allegoricaily stand for the virtuous Henry V, the ideai England and the band of
brotherhood among the English. Not the least element of discord is allowed to
undermine Olivier’s and, by proxy, the MOI’s and the government’s ideologically
visible single meaning. This makes it even clearer that the use ofpropaganda in such
a democracy as Britain, as exemplified by Olivier’s Herny V cannot be used to
“counter totalitarian ideologies” (Chapman 44). At best, the propaganda of
democracy cannot be quaiitatively different from that of dictatorship. It is simply in
the nature of propaganda to manipulate and reduce the riclmess ofthe object-to-be to
suit the interests of those promoting or sponsoring the propaganda, be it the Stalinist
regime, or the British democratic govemment dunng World War II.
In my second chapter, I situated the moment of the production of Olivier’s
propaganda feature film Herny V in the history of the MOI emphasizing the whole
process of selection that bas led to the fact that feature-films have corne to single
handedly represent the “national case” (Chaprnan 16). Then, I showed how British
actor and director Olivier used the cultural authority of Shakespeare to contribute to
the war effort through the cinematic medium. In my analysis of the film, I pointed
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out the different strategies to which Olivier resorts in his metamorphosing of the
Shakespearean Henry V into an acceptable heroic figure for the British audience of
the I 940s. Among these strategies, I examined Olivier’s omission of certain scenes
and his recourse to the distortion of others. Furthermore, my examination of the film,
in light of the conclusions I reached conceming the historical and the political
circumstances that led to its production, led me to conclude that after all Olivier’s
Herny V can be seen as representing the sectional interests of those in power, rather
than national interests.
Chapter III
Our Empire lias a Rome: Reading the current world order tlirough
Shakespeare’s Heiny V
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In my first chapter, I examined Henry V’s project to forge the English nation
through bis reliance on Machiavellian strategies such as the use of religion, and the
recourse to international war. It is on this embryonic unified English nation and the
ideal English king, Henry V, that Olivier bases bis adaptation of Shakespeare’s play
with a view to boosting the morale of British cinemagoers during World War II.
Shakespeare’s play, as well as the use to which Olivier puts it gives us an insight into
the nature of the world that produced them. Indeed, they testify to the fact that the
burgeoning Early Modem English state and the World War II British nation-state can
be situated safely within the modem paradigm of sovereignty, as it is described by
Hardt and Negri in the section entitled “$overeignty of the Nation State” of their
book Empire. Binary oppositions between inside and outside as far as the national
territory is concemed, and self and Other, as far as the identity question is concemed,
are ofparamount importance to both states. for instance, it is against the French and
the Nazis that the identities ofthe English and the British are defined respectively. In
this chapter, I contend that a good understanding of the nature of our contemporary
world can be reached through a reading of the same Shakespearean play in the
aflermath of 9/11, in light of the parallel drawn between George W. Bush and Henry
V, by such an authority in public leadership as David Gergen—professor in public
leadership at the John f. Keimedy School of Governrnent, Harvard University.
Moreover, I intend to describe the nature of our globalizing world through a
juxtaposition of the following texts: Shakespeare’s Hemy J’Ç Hardt and Negri’s
Empire, and A. Passavant and Jodi Dean’s Empire ‘s New CÏothes: Reading Hardt
and Negri. My reading of these texts will be taking account of the occurrences that
68
marked the international scene in the afiermath of 9/11, mainly the American war on
Iraq, which broke out on March 22, 2003.
Reading George W. Bush’s war on terror through Herny V elucidates the
nature of the contemporary world through the paradigm of modem sovereignty. It
aiso makes it clear that we caimot conceive of the present globalizïng world order as
an anonymous decentered empire, the way Hardt and Negri contend in their Empire.
Rather, examining the present world order, with the parallels drawn between Bush’s
war on terror and Henry’s war on France in mmd, is significant in so far as it
elucidates the process of the intemationalization of the state, or more precisely of the
US-state, the way Laffey and Weldes present it in their “Representing the
International: Sovereignty afier Modemity?” Here, I do not mean to assess the
present world order by favoring Laffey and Weides’s theorization of it, and
discarding that of Hardt and Negri. Instead, I contend that the present world order
can be accounted for more satisfactorily when we take into account both Hardt and
Negri’s emphasis on the passage from the modem paradigm of sovereignty to the
postmodem one, and Laffey and Weldes’s focus on the intemationalization of the
state as a structure of govemance and mie (133). Bringing together these aspects of
two conceptions of the giobalizing world order, which might seem contradictory
because of the importance of the nation state for one and its deciine for the other, can
give us an insiglit into the way globalization works. In this sense, the roie played by
the USA, as the leading superpower in the process of globalization, can be seen as a
result not oniy of the intemationaiization of the American “structure of mie” (Laffey
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and Weldes 133), and American-style policing apparatuses, but also of a number of
discourses that were conflned to the national reaim.
The first part of thïs chapter explores the aspects of Shakespeare’s Herny V
that have caused a large number ofAmerican iv presenters, 12 contributing editors to
the National Review Online, and authorities in public leadership such as David
Gergen to draw a parallel between Henry V and George W. Bush, and their respective
wars)3 Then, I will rethink the present globalizing world through an exploration of
the parallel drawn between Shakespeare’s Henry V and Bush. In my second chapter,
I studied the use of Olivier’s cinematographic adaptation of Herny V for propaganda
purposes dunng World War II. Though the early modem Elizabethan state cannot be
taken as the equivalent of the fùlly developed British nation-state of the 1 940s, the
conception of the war, the enemy, and the nation we find both in Shakespeare’s play
and in Olivier’s allegorical depiction of the war of the allies against the Nazis situate
both works of art within the paradigm of modemity. Interestingly enough, the same
play is called upon in the aftermath of 9/1 1 to depict George W. Bush’s war on terror.
Though our globalizing world order is clearly postmodem, as Hardt and Negri argue,
the war on terror is marketed through the deployment of discourses that are
characteristic of the modem paradigm of sovereignty. It is the resemblance between
the discourses used by both Bush and Henry V that explains the parallel that is
commonly drawn between the Shakespearean character and his twenty-first century
counterpart in US media. Among these discourses, I will refer to the discourse of
12 Ibis parallel between Henry V and George W. Bush was drawo by American TV presenters, like
senior CNN analyst JeffGreenfleld.
Among the contributing editors to the National Review Online who mention this parallel, I may refer
to Mackubin Thomas Owens, Peter Robinson, and Rich Lowry.
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good versus evil, and “us” versus “them” through which they try to unify their
respective peoples against the enemy.
Indeed, Bush and Henry V constantly refer to the dichotomy between “us” and
“them”. Henry V keeps on opposing we — noble English (III. 1. 202)—to they,
namely the French—”our bad neighbors” (IV. 1. 257). This rhetorical strategy
resorted to by king Henry reaches its climax in his sixteen-line speech, on the day of
the Agincourt Battie. In this speech, Henry uses the personai pronoun we three times,
the pronoun “us” three times, and the possessive “our” two times (IV. 1. 256-8). As
far as the French are concemed, they are referred to as “they,” “things evil,” “the
weed,” and “the devil hirnself’ (IV. 1. 257). Bearing this in mmd whiie examining
the eighteen speeches delivered by George W. Bush, on different occasions between
September 14, 2001 and Apnl 9, 2002—almost a year before the Second GulfWar
(March 22, 2003), one cannot fail to note the striking resemblance between the
rhetorical strategies used by Henry V and George W. Bush. Indeed, in ail of those
speeches, the “we,” Americans defending the cause of good, is constantly pitted
against “them,” evil-doers. It is worth noting that in these speeches, the word “evil
doers” is mentioned 29 times, and the word “evil” 33 times. A far more stnking
resemblance between George W. Bush’s speeches and Henry V’s is their
foregrounding of the possibility that good can corne from evil. Indeed, Henry V says
“{t]hus may we gather honey from the weed/ And rnake a morai from the devii
himseif’ (IV. 1. 251). The same idea is expressed by Bush differentiy when he says
“the eviidoers have struck our nation, but out of evii cornes good”. This very iast
instance of resembiance between Bush’s speeches and Henry’s makes us wonder
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whether the president speechwriters have flot drawn their inspiration from Henry V.
Bush’s recourse to the binary opposition between the good American and the evil
terrorist enables him to unite the ranks of Americans by emphasizing their
homogeneity, which he achieves through positing the evil terrorist as the Other of the
American. Here, one is reminded of Hardt and Negri’s articulation of the notion of
the people within the paradigm ofmodem sovereignty, when they say “the people [...]
tends towards identity and homogeneity intemally whule posing its difference from
and exciuding what remains outside” (103). In the aftermath of 9/11, the terrorist
clearly plays the role ofthe outside in the American identitarian equation.
Bush’s reliance on this Manichaean discourse of good versus evil explains, to
a large extent, the fact that most peopie who draw the parallel between the American
president and Henry V imagine the former delivering the St. Crispin’s Day speech
and calling the American people a “band ofbrothers” (IV. 3. 291). To illustrate thïs,
I may quote Rich Lowry, when he says, “I thought that last friday, as Bush stood
atop part of the rubble of the World Trade Center, he came as close as he ever will to
delivering a St. Crispin’s Day speech. That spirit and resolve carried over into the
House chamber last night, and it was something to behold” (Newstrom, par. 17).14
Indeed, the homogeneity and cohesion of the ranks of Americans depend on their
difference from the terrorist Other. However, this brotherhood seems to leave out ail
those Americans, described by Passavant and Dean, as “the ‘sleeper’ or ‘dormant’
terrorists who live among us, adopting western practices of life, working, going to
school, and generally disguisïng themselves as good neighbors” (321). These
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Americans are excluded because they happen to share the cultural background of the
terrorists, despite their condemnation of the terrorist acts and their being, as
Americans, in the “us” camp. Though most people who refer to the parallel between
Bush and Henry V underscore their unification of their respective peoples through
rhetoric, none of them refers to the party excluded from the American “band of
brothers,” none of them tries to address the nature of the racism at work in the
exclusion (W. 3. 291).
Here, I argue that addressing the nature of this racism can guide our steps
towards a better understanding of the nature of our contemporary world order. In
fact, this kind of racism can be classified under the category of imperial racism, as
Hardt and Negri articulate it in Empire (190). According to them, the shifi from the
modem paradigm of sovereignty to the postmodem paradigm is accompanied flot by
a recession of racism, but by its mutation and its taking a postmodem form. This
postmodem model of racism is characterized by its being based on culture, rather
than on biology. Hardt and Negri put this more eloquently when they say, “the
dominant modem racist theory and the concomitant practices of segregation are
centered on essential biological differences among races,” while “with the passage to
empire [...j, biological differences have been replaced by sociological and cultural
signifiers as the key representation of racial hatred and fear” (191).
The distinctive nature of the racism and exclusion resulting from Bush’s use
of the Manichaean discourse of civilization versus barbarism, or good versus cvii, at
the domestic level, allows us to see that Bush’s constant use of the “us” versus
“ Rich Lowry is a contribiiting editor to the National Review Online. Another contributing editor who
imagines George W. Bush delivering a St. Cnspin’s Day speech, and calling the American people a
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“them” does not situate the USA within the modem paradigm of sovereignty, the way
Henry’s use of them sifliates his England. Rather, it broadens the Arnerican “band of
brothers” (IV. 3. 291), if we are to exciude the category of Americans described
above, to include subject states that would stand side by side with the USA—our
postmodem Empire’s Rome, to contradict Hardt and Negri (317). It is the world’s
only superpower in the “world’s fight or ‘civilization’s fight” (Passavant and Dean
316), as Bush put it in his speech of September 20, 2001. The postrnodem nature of
the enemy posited by the USA in its war on terror, and the universal appeal of a just
war of good versus evil accounts for the explosion of US boundaries. It is also
explained by the fact that the USA reached a point at which politics bas corne to be
“cornpletely integrated into the system of transnational command” (Hardt and Negri
307), and the shifi of US foreign policy from defense to security.
What is interesting about the parallel between Bush’s and Henry’s wars, and
their use of similar rhetorical strategies, is that when we read them in light of
Empire’s symptoms of passage from modem sovereignty to imperial sovereignty, we
can corne to a better understanding of the rnost powerfiul state-- in military, econornic,
and cultural terms-- in our globalizing world, and of the new world order resulting, to
a large extent, from the latter’s policies. The only problern with Hardt and Negri’s
theorization of the contemporary world order is that it is based on the fact that “the
United States does not, and ïndeed, no nation-state can today, form the center of an
imperialist project” (xiv). Likewise, when seen in light of the war on Iraq (March
2003), their conception of the relationship between the USA, as the defender of
global right (180), and the United Nations proves to be erroneous. However, to do
«band ofbrothers » is Balint Vazsonyi (Newstrom, par. 17).
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justice to Hardt and Negri, we must take into account the historical circumstances
under which Empire was written. Indeed, as both writers state in their preface,
Empire “was begun weii afier the end of the Persian Guif War” (xvii). This means
that at the time of the production ofthe book, the USA was stili abiding by the miings
of the UN, which expiains the way Hardt and Negri conceive of the relationship
between the USA and the UN. Before examining Bush’s postmodem version of
Henry’s strategies and wars, I want to say that I will be relying on Laffey and
Weldes’s notion of the intemationalization of the state as a structure of mie and
govemance, and David Harvey’s explanation ofthe war on Iraq to fr11 the gaps left in
Hardt and Negri’s theorization of Empire.
Thus, Bush’s use of the discourse of good versus evil broadens the notion of
the American “hand of brothers” to inciude flot only Americans, but aiso subject
nation-states wiiiing to engage in America’s crusade on terror (W. 3. 291). This
intemationalization ofAmerica’s war on a postmodem, ubiquitous and elusive enemy
is secured through depicting the latter as the enemy of civilization and good, which
are universally cherished (Hardt and Negri 151). This is put cleariy by George W.
Bush, when he says in his speech of September 20, 2001, describing his war on
terror, that “this is the world’s fight” (Passavant and Dean 316). Though Henry V
refers similarly to the war of the English against the French as a war of good versus
evil, the enemy in question is material and locatabie. This goes back to the fact that
Henry’s war on France can be situated within the paradigm of modem sovereignty, as
it is a war between “two national sovereigns involved in a boundary dispute”
(Passavant and Dean 321). It is a war between two bounded territories conveyed
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rhetorically through the opposition between the French, our “bad neighbors” (W. 1.
257), and the “noble English” (III. 1. 202). Like the modem territory of England and
France, the modem identities of the English and the French are clearly marked by
closure, homogeneity, and exclusion of the Other. Though the ideal English army,
which allegoricaily stands for a unified England, includes people from England’s
insurgent Scottish, Welsh, and Irish neighbors, along with such masterless men as
Bardolph, Nym, and Pistol, who were considered subversive subjects during the
Renaissance, Henry’s St. Crispin’s speech succeeds in unifying them ail against their
conmion French enemy, ieaving none out. This homogeneous national identity finds
its most eloquent—though jingoistic—expression, in Henry’s phrase “band of
brothers,” which leaves no section of the English society out. Taking this into
account, one can see that America’s “band of brothers” is of a postmodem nature, as
the American territory producing it is characterized by porous boundaries. Moreover,
the dividing une between its inside and outside is blurred. The terrorist Other can be
within American boundaries; and subject nation-states that share America’s
conception of the war on terror as civilization’s fight against barbarism, and thus
make up part of its “coalition of the willing, or to put it in Shakespearean parlance, its
“band ofbrothers,” can be beyond those boundaries.
What is interesting about reading the coalition of the willing as an instance of
the intemationalization of the American “hand of brothers” is that it gives us an
insight into the international community resulting from America’s war on terror.
Here, it is important to remember the fact that the war on Iraq was waged against the
decision of the United Nations. In this sense, the war on Iraq debunks Hardt and
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Negri’s theorization of our globalizing world order, maïnly as far as their conception
of the relationship between the USA and the United Nations is concerned. Indeed,
they see the USA as contributing to the international conmlunity through its use ofits
military prowess to defend global nght (180). Hardt and Negri put this clearly when
they say: “the United States is the peace police, but only in the final instance, when
the supranational organizations of peace cali for organizational activity and an
articulated complex ofjuridical and organizational initiative” (181). This conception
of an international community governed by “a legitimate supranational motor of
jundical action” like the UN, and defended by the USA, which would abide by and
defend international law, is flot a good assessment of the relation between the United
Nations and the United States, if we are to take into account the fact that the USA
went against the decision ofthe UN flot to wage war on Iraq in 2003 (Hardt and Negri
E 181). However, what is worth noting about Guif War II is not its being fought
against the decision of the UN, but rather that it enabled the USA to constitute an
international community outside the jurisdiction of the UN. Though this international
community does not have the legal weight or the sanction of such powerful countries
as France and Germany—temporary as that may be, it evidences the matchless power
of the USA, on the international level. In this sense, like Henry’s war on France,
Bush’s war on terror enables the latter to forge a comrnunity. However, the two
communities resulting from these wars are different, as the community brought about
by the war on terror includes subjects who are beyond the geographical boundaries of
the USA.
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Here, I will move to examining another important rhetorical element that
unites this new international community, namely Bush’s presentation of the war on
terror as a just war. This is what explains, for instance, the empliasis Bush places on
the justice the coalition’s war on lraq will bring about, when he asserts that “whether
we bring our enemies to justice or justice to our enemies, justice will be done”
(Zaraefsky 145). Like the Manichaean discourse of good versus evil, reading Bush’s
use ofthe concept ofjust war, which is also used by Henry V, also gives us an insight
into the nature of the contemporary world order. In both cases, Henry V and Bush
seem to hark back to one of Machiavelli’s basic lessons, namely the importance of
appearing religious for a good prince. Indeed, the following passage from The Prince
seems uncannily to guide the steps ofboth Henry V and Bush in their war campaign:
{tJo those seeing and hearing him, he should appear a man of
compassion, a man of good faith, a man of integrity, a kind and
religious man. And there is nothing so important as to seem to have
this last quality. Men in general judge by their eyes rather than by
their hands; because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a
position to corne in close touch with you. Everyone sees what you
appear to be, few experience what you really are. (5$)
As I have shown in my first chapter, among the Machiavellian strategies that Henry V
adopts is the use of religion. In fact, flot only does he masquerade as a Christian king,
but he also presents his war on france as a just war, or to put it in Hardt and Negri’s
terms, as an ethical instrument to solve the territorial dispute between England and
France (12). The religiosity of the king, which is reflected through his religious
conversion and abundant references to God, lis doiming of the cloak ofjustice on his
war, and his depiction ofit as a war of good versus evil represent the king’s efforts to
meet the need of bis people to have a religious and virtuous king. They also express
7$
bis awareness of the importance of the justness of a war—or at least the apparent
justness of a war—is a sine qua non for marketing it successfully to the people. This
is what explains the long and tortuous demonstration ofthe justice ofHemy’s war by
the Archbishop, which extends over the second scene of the first Act. Depicting the
cause of England as a just cause sanctioned by religious authorities and biessed by
God, a blessing that Henry discovers at the end of the play with the victory of the
English, when he says “O God—Thy arm was here; / And flot to us, but to thy arm
alone, ascribe we ail!” further unites the ranks ofthe English (W. 8. 330).
Before exploring the outiines of the new world order that a comparison of
Bush’s depiction of bis war on terror as a just war with that of Henry’s enables us to
sec, I want to underscore the fact that there can be no just war, be it from Erasmus’s
point of view, as I have clearly shown in my first cliapter, or from the point of view
Immanuel Kant presents in bis Peipetuat Feace. In fact, Kant sees that no war can be
just, were it only for the fact that there are no courts to judge the justness of a war, or
lack thereof. Kant puts this clearly when lie says that:
[wjar, however, is only the sad recourse in the state of nature (where
there is no tribunal which could judge with force of law) by which
each state asserts its right by violence and in which neither party can
be adjudged unjust (for that would presuppose a juridical decision; in
light of such a decision the issue of the conflict (as if given by a so
calledjudgement ofGod) decides on which side justice lives. (8)
This means that even representing the war as necessary and just in the case of Henry
V’s war on france, or Bush’s war on terror can, in no way, make their wars ethical
instruments (Hardt and Negri 12). A war, thus, by nature bas nothing to do with
morality or justice. In the case ofBush’s, and Henry’s war campaigns, the concept of
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just war is used to win the people’s support for the wars, and further unite their
peoples.
Here, it is worth noting that the big unes of the project for the formation of a
league of nations, which Kant outiines near the end of his Perpetual Peace provides
the blue print for the United Nations, as we know it. This league, as Kant conceives
of it, will guarantee international peace. What is important about the Kantian project
is flot the fact that it predicts the foundation of the UN, which is actually made up of
independent nation-states and aims at resolving disputes arising between them; rather,
this project, when read in light of what happened on the international scene in the
afiermath of 9/11, is significant because it rerninds us that the UN was founded to
solve problems arising among independent nation-states. In other words, it is not
conceived to deal with problems posed by the postrnodern terrorist enerny that cannot
be identified with a single nation-state. This enerny anticipates the USA’s flouting
the decision of the UN. More precïsely, it anticipates the defeat of the UN as the
international referee when it cornes to the irnplernentation of UN resolutions the USA
rej ects.
Furthennore, it signals the passage from modern sovereignty to postmodern
sovereignty. Indeed, the enemy against whom the war on tenor is waged is the
diffuse networks of Muslim fundamentalists connected to, or like, A1-Qaeda. The
rise of such a network is a symptom of passage to postmodern sovereignty. Hardt
and Negri put this clearly, when they say “[a]nother symptom of the historical
passage already in process in the final decades of the twentieth century is the rise of
so-called ftmdamentalisms” (146). Being postmodern, elusive, and ubiquitous, this
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enemy is portrayed in the war on terror campaigns as endangering the interests of the
USA. The fact that these terrorists can have ceils anywhere in the world, and more
precisely the fact that this can endanger the interests of the USA, makes us aware of
the extent to which US capitalist and geopolitical interests have expanded beyond the
boundaries of the USA. This expansion of the USA and of its interests led, afier the
attacks of 9/11, to the shifi in US foreign policy from defense to security, as Hardt
and Negri contend in their Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age ofEmpire. To
defend the integrity of its territory and its interests, which span almost the whole
globe, the USA has opted for a preemptive war on terror in the case of Iraq, without
the sanction ofthe UN.
Here, I contend that US violation of the UN’s resolution signals the birth of
the new international community I described above. Like Henry V, George W. Bush
unites this international community through depicting bis war on terror not only as a
war of good versus cvii, but also as a just war. In fact, nothing ïs more universally
appreciated than justice and the prevention of more terrorist attacks that may lead to
the death of innocent people. The justice the USA thinks the UN was unable to bring
about is the very concept around which the former rhetorically builds its international
community. Bush states this clearly when he stresses the centrality of justice to his
war on terror, in his speech of September 20, 2003 saying “whether we bring our
cnemies to justice or justice to our enemies justice will 5e donc” (Zaraefsky 145).
Moreover, the unity of the new international community is made stronger through the
internationalization of the American state as a structure of mie and crime control.
Weldes and Laffey show this clearly when they say that “the solution to this
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internationlized security threat is, of course, enhanced international coordination and
increased policing at ail levels” (136). This coordination, according to them, can only
be reached through “the fact that [US] borders too are being extraterritorialized:
policing of organized crime extends the US state—its organizing principles and
institutional-legal structures—into the territories of myriad other states” (Passavant
and Dean 137). This can be seen at work through an examination of the transformed
structures of mie in sucli a country as Afghanistan, afler America’s war on the
terrorist Taliban regime there. Aller that war, Afghanistan adopted the institutional
structures the USA deems necessary for the construction of a democracy. This is
pointed out by a report published on the officiai site oftlie White House, which states
that:
Historic Days in Afghanistan: On October 9, 2004, the Afghan peopie
made history by holding their first direct presidential election, with
both men and women voting. They also adopted a constitution that
protects the rights of ail, whule honoring their nation’s most cherished
traditions. The Afghan people have proven to the world that there is a
yearning among peopie everywhere for democracy and freedom.
Working Cooperativeiy with Nations around the World: America
continues to work tirelessly with our many counterterrorism partners
overseas to deny al-Qaida any safe liarbor and to disrupt their terrorist
plots. The President aiso continues to strengthen America ‘s defenses
in the War on Terror. (White House, par. 22)
The same thing applies to Iraq, in the afiermath of the Coalition’s war on it. The
USA, for instance, has taken charge of training the new Iraqi police forces and the
Iraqi govemment presentiy in power lias adopted the views of the USA, thus making
Iraq part of America’s international “hand of brothers,” and may, in the future,
contribute to America’s on-going war on terror, as part of the aforementioned
brotlierhood, the way Afghanistan contributed to the war on lraq (IV. 3. 291).
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Exploring the forging of this international community with Machiavelli’s The
Prince in mmd, mainly his emphasizing the importance of the forging of a citizen
army for the unification and security of a country, as I have shown in my first
chapter, enables us to see the different subject nation-states involved in the coalition
of the willing as the postmodem counterparts of the soldiers making up Henry’s
citizen-army. Indeed, the current internationalization of the security issue of the
USA, the American structure of mie, and the importance of the American capital in
Transnational Corporations have led to the fact that the surface of the globe lias
become smooth for US and transnational capital. As a consequence, the open
imperial American space lias no longer any outside, and ail the subject nation-states
beyond its geographical boundaries have to be absorbed into the American military
machine to flirther protect the USA and the interests of global capital and the world.
Though there have always been military alliances even back in the world of ancient
empires, the American imperial military machine is different from these alliances as
the subject nation-states that contribute to it either have common capitalist interests
with the states, or have been structurally transformed by America’s war on terror, as
it is the case with Afghanistan.
Here, I suggest that reading the present globalizing world order through the
Polybian model of imperial Rome, which we can see at work in Shakespeare’s Herny
V, can help us understand American expansionism. Polybius’s concept of the perfect
forni ofpower is “stmctured by a mixed constitution that combines monarchie power,
aristocratie power, and democratic power” (Hardt and Negri 163). Furthermore,
tracing the Polybian model in Shakespeare’s Hemy V allows us to see the present
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world order as an “evolution beyond the modem, liberal model of a mixed
constitution” (Hardt and Negri 316-7). In fact, when we read Hem-y V, we can see
that it is an embodiment of the Polybian model in the sense that Henry’s England is
based on bringing together three good forms ofpower, namely monarchy, aristocracy,
and democracy. In this play, monarchic power is wielded by an ideal king who
brings together military and rhetorical prowess respectively through his victory in the
battie of Agincourt and hïs St. Crispin’s speech. This king is helped financially and
militarily by his noblemen, who are richer than the noblemen any other English king
had (I. 2. 138). These noblemen along with the businessmen bishops, who promised
the king to “raise your highness such a mighty suml As neyer did the clergy at one
time! Bring in to any of your ancestors” contribute to the war effort and make up the
aristocratic power (I. 2. 139). As far as the democratic power is concemed, it is
constituted by the soldiers—who make up the citizen-army.
Another fundamental aspect of this model is its being based on the
transcendence of limits through expansion, hence the parallel Hardt and Negri draw
between the imperial Roman constitution and the crucial role of the frontier
movement in the building of an American democracy. This second aspect of the
Polybian model can also be seen at work through Henry’s war on France. The
“democratic foundations led to both the continuous production of conflicts and the
appropriation ofnew territories,” in Henry’s England (Hardt and Negri 166). Indeed,
Henry V, the representative of the monarchic form of power, was faced with the
necessity of dealing not only with conflicts at the level of the democratic form of
power, but also at the level of the aristocratic one. The representatives of the former
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are the people among whom there were lots of disbanded soldiers [and] hardy
vagabonds,” who were the cause of many disturbances (Mowat 287). Moreover, a
section of the aristocratic form conspired to overthrow the king and enthrone the Earl
of March, the legitimate claimant to the throne, according to the architects of the
Southampton Plot. Confronted with these problems at the domestic level, being
aware of the necessity of strengthening his hold on a usurped throne and of unifying
lis kingdom, Henry V resorts to the Machiavellian strategy of waging international
war, as I showed at length in my first chapter. This war, along with Henry’s recourse
to his discursive weapons, displace the domestic problems with which he was faced
beyond the boundaries ofhis kingdom, thus expanding thc territory under his control.
In the section of “Network Power: US Sovereignty,” Hardt and Negri
conceive ofthe Polybian model ofthe perfect Roman empire as being “structured by
a mixed constitution that combines monarchic power, aristocratic power, and
democratic power” (163). I showed above how Henry’s England provides a good
example of this moUd. This imperial model is well situated wïthin the paradigm of
modem sovereignty, as it is constituted by a mixture of different and separate forms
of power. In their section of “Mixed Constitution,” Hardt and Negri try to use this
mode! in an effort to articulate the current globalizing world order, and they reach the
conclusion that the modem version of the Polybian model cannot be an appropriate
tool for the task they set for themselves, and that only a postmodem version of the
Polybian model can be helpful. They put this clearly when they say:
[tJhe empire that is emerging today, however, is not really a throwback
to the ancient Polybian model, even in its negative ‘bad’ form. The
contemporary arrangement is better understood in postmodem terms,
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that is, as an evolution beyond the modem, liberal mode! of a mixed
constitution. (316-7)
What characterizes the postmodem version of the Polybian model, and makes it
different from the modem version, is the fact that instead of having a “mixtum of
separate forms of power,” we have a hybridization of those forms of powers (Hardt
and Negri 309).
Rethinking the Polybian model in postmodem terms, Hardt and Negri end up
seeing the three tiers of the “pyramid of global constitution” as the postmodem
version ofthe three forms ofpower outlined above. In fact, they see that the first tier
of the pyramid which “holds hegemony over the global use of force,” with the USA
at its pinnacle, represents the monarchic form of power (309). The aristocratie form
ofpower is represented by the second tier of the pyrarnid, and “is structured primarily
by the networks that transnational capitalist corporations have extended throughout
the world market—networks of capital flows, technology flows, population flows,
and the like” (Hardt and Negri 310). The nation-states, non-governmental
organizations and such institutions as religion and the media contribute to the third
and biggest tier of the pyramid of global constitution, and are the components of the
postmodem Polybian democratic form ofpower. Though Hardt and Negri provide us
wih a postmodem imperial, and globalized version of the Polybian model, which is
an interesting reading of our globalizing world order, they fail to tackie a fundamenta!
aspect of that order, and of the Polybian model, namely expansion. b put it more
clearly, they do talk about exapansionism throughout their book, but do not talk about
it as the resuit of the conflicts or disturbances at the level of the democratic form of
power.
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As I have aiready said in other sections of this chapter, the intemationalization
of the American state and the peerless importance of the USA in the global
configuration of power are facts to be taken into account if we are to reach a good
understanding of our globalizing world order. Here, I contend that the parallels
drawn between Bush and Henry V can be very enlightening, if we read the
expansionism of the USA with its war on terror in terms of a postmodem version of
the Polybian democratic form ofEnglish power. “The democratic foundations” ofthe
USA before the war on Iraq, for instance, “lcd to the [...J continuous production of
discontent” among Americans (Hardt and Negri 166). A quick glance at the Gallup
poil during the period leading to the Second Gulf War shows the discontent of the
American peopie with the economic state of affairs. More significantly, those polis
demonstrate the increasing anxiety of Americans related to a possible energy
shortage. This discontent at the level of democratic power increased the possibility of
conflicts between the democratic power and the other modes of power. In order to
transcend those limits at the domestic level, the war on Iraq was undertaken. This
war, as I argued earlier on, has so far succeeded in Americanizing the legal and
policing Iraqi institutions.
What is different about the expansionism of the USA, when compared to that
of England’s, is the fact that it can be taken as a new phase of the frontier movement.
Though the frontier movement that expanded the American territory from the Atiantic
to the Pacific came to an end in the late 1 890s, it kept on mutating ever since to take
the form of landing on the moon in the 1 960s, and the intemationalization of the
American state, which is presently underway. The other factor that makes US
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expansionism different from the expansionism ofEngland is the fact that it evidences
the hybridization of government that is characteristic of the postmodem version ofthe
Polybian model, as Hardt and Negri conceive of it. Indeed, the monarchic power is
no longer totally separate from the aristocratie power. To illustrate this, I may refer
to the fact that both Bush and his vice-president, Dick Cheney, had business careers
before entering the world of politics, and make defending transnational interests a
priority.
This hybridization is even clearer, when we see the war on Iraq from David
Harvey’s perspective. According to Harvey, the war on Iraq was fought to further the
interests of transnational capital, in general, and American capital, in particular, and
flot to rid the world of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, which afier all proved
to be non-existent. He contends that since oil is of paramount importance to the
global economy, it makes sense that if the United States controls the “Global oil
spigot,” it will, at least temporarily keep its position as a superpower. Harvey puts
this eloquently when he says, “there is, however, an even grander perspective from
which to understand the ou question. It can be captured in the following proposition:
whoever controls the Middle East controls the global ou spigot and whoever controls
the global oil spigot can control the global economy, at least for the near future” (19).
Furthermore, we can sec the hybridization of govemment through the way
changes and tendencies at the level of the democratic form of power influence or
actually produce discourse at the level of the monarchie form of power. An
examination of the importance of religion in the decisions American people make,
and of its influence on the discourses of Bush since the 2000 elections, and on bis
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campaign of the war on terror is very helpfiul. Here, I want to go back to one aspect
of Bush’s life that lias constantly been referred to by most of those who draw a
parallel between him and Henry V, namely his religious conversion. Among these, I
may refer to David Gergen, who liolds tliat:
[wjhen trouble hit, liow rapidly we lefi behind tlie pages of Henry tlie
4th and suddenly we seem to be into the pages of Henry the 5th. There
had been a transformation as young George W. Bush stepped up to.
Now, to be sure, lie has flot won his Agincourt, but lie lias set sail, and
for that the country can be grateful. (Newstrom, par. 17)15
As I showed in my flrst cliapter, being aware of the importance his people
give to having a virtuous and religious king, Hemy V skillfully masquerades as one.
Here, I do not mean to debate the authenticity ofBush’s conversion, for that would be
beside the point. Ratlier, wliat is wortli noting about Bush’s conversion and use of
tlie religious discourse, in his war campaign is tliat they reveal the fact that the
postmodem monarchic form of power is no longer totally separate from tlie
democratic one. Marketing policies tliat a certain administration chooses to carry out
can only be successfuily achieved, if tliese policies speak to tlie convictions of tlie
representatives of the democratic form of power. from 2000 to tlie present day,
morality and religion, in tlie USA play an increasing role in the lives of Americans
and in the decisions tliey make. To iliustrate this, I may refer to Gallup poil nation-
wide survey of likely voters in tlie summer of 2000:
[t]he question asked to tlie people interviewed in the survey is ‘{H]ow
important wilI your own personal religious beliefs and faith be in
deciding your vote for president this year?’ 54 percent responded with
‘extremely important’, ‘very important’, or ‘somewliat important.’
(Medliurst 126)
National Review Online contributing editor Peter Robinson, MSNBC presenter Chris Mathews, and
CNN senior analyst JeffGreenfield also refer to the religious conversion ofGeorge W. Bush, when
they draw the parallel between the latter and Henry V.
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However, the conversion of George W. Bush along with his anti-abortion attitude and
his encouragement of faith-based initiatives, in bis 2000 presidential campaign,
intelligently target a section of the electorate that is known for ïts conservative
political stance, namely the evangelicals. The conriection between Bush’s choosing
Evangelicalism, in particular, is articulated clearly by Sam Allis, when he says:
[t]he connection between bis religious conversion [Bush’s] and his
politics is huge. In the 2000 election, almost haif of his nearly 50
million votes—about 23 million—came from evangelicals. [...] At
that time, more than 40 percent of Americans described themselves as
evangelicals, and 70 percent of those evangelicals who voted were
politically conservative. This bloc, quite simply, was and is Bush’s
most important base. (Allis, par.2)
Bush’s appeal to the religious side of the lives of his people, in general, and to the
conservative attitudes of evangelicals in particular, during 2000 presidential elections
was also adopted in the afiermath of 9/11. In this sense, the importance of religion
and morality in the lives of Americans—at the domestic level, and the universal
appeal ofthe discourse ofgood versus evil and defendingjustice—at the international
level, have determined indirectly the form of the presidential discourses, during
America’s war on terror. As Medhurst put it, the language Bush spoke during his
2000 presidential election campaign, like the language spoken in the aflermath of
9/11, “resonated with large segments of the public because it was based on values
widely held and attitudes toward religion and morality broadly shared” (121).
So far I have examined the way we can understand the current globalizing
world order through a hybrid reading of the configuration of global power. Hybrid
reading, here, refers to bringing together Hardt and Negri’s emphasis on the passage
from the paradigm of modem sovereignty to the paradigm of postmodern
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sovereignty, and the internationalization of the state as a structure of rule, the way
their detractors Weldes and Laffey conceive of it. It is only such a hybrid reading
that can do justice to a hybrid world, where the importance of the postmodern
paradigm of sovereignty does flot mean the end of the nation state. To be more
precise, the new configuration of power is based on the continuing, and increasing
sovereignty of powerful states like the USA, France, and Germany, on the one hand,
and the decline of the sovereignty of those states belonging to the underdeveloped
world. In this sense, the openess of the postmodern imperial American space
outlined above means the porous boundaries of other countries—mainly
underdeveloped ones—and the openess of their spaces to Amcrican capital, and
American military forces. What is worth noting about this openess of the American
imperial space is that it is one way only, which means that underdeveloped countries
are aiways faced with the reality of rigid boundaries. The ever increasing rigid
boundaries of powerful states, ami the porous boundaries of underdeveloped nation
states, which are characteristic of the current globalizing world order, accounts, in
part, for its hybridity, but can, in no way, mean that we have reached the demise of
the nation-state. This hybridity is also pointed out clearly by Laffey and Weldes,
when they say:
[b]ut contrary to Hardt and Negri’s daim, the international is flot
characterized by “smooth space”: borders, whule transformed, remain
significant. They are in some instances becoming thinner and in
others thicker. European union borders within Shengen area, for
instance, are being eliminated for some purposes, but not for others.
Within Shengen, despite the elimination of border controls, the
movements of “football hooligans” are being surveilled and policed; at
the same time borders around Shengen are being strengthened to keep
out undesirable migrants. (129)
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Laffey and Weldes are right to underscore the fact that Hardt and Negri’s conception
of empire as “smooth space” cannot be taken in absolute ternis. They are also right to
emphasize the closure of the Shengen area to people from the outside. Here, again,
we go back to the modem conception of a sovereign territory, which is based on
closure and on positing an Other to its citizens.
Weldes and Laffey’s mentioning the Shengen area is reminiscent of another
element that evidences the strong relation between the power of a state and its
sovereignty, or lack thereof: the passport. Depending on the country where a
traveler’s passport was issued, barriers are either eroded or strengthened. That is to
say, if a traveler is from North America, or the European Union, no visas are required
to go as a tourist to places like Jamaica Kincaid’s Antigua. However, when a traveler
is from places like Antigua, he or she will feel the rigidity of the American frontier,
for instance, when applying for an entry visa. A passage from Kincaid’s A 8mai!
Place renders this beautifiully:
[y]ou disembark from your plane. You go through customs. Since
you are a tourist, a North American or European—to be frank, white—
and flot an Antiguan black retuming to Antigua from Europe or North
Europe with cardboard boxes of much needed cheap clothes ami food
for relatives, you move through customs swiftly, you move through
customs with ease. Your bags are flot searched. (4-5)
Here, a question begs to be asked: can we consider that the strong boundaries
that characterize the territories of “developed” countries situate the latter within the
paradigm of modem sovereignty? Answering the question in the positive is not
incorrect, but it leaves a substantial side of the global configuration of power
unaccounted for. In fact, what characterizes powerful nation-states presently is their
straddling the modem and postmodcm paradigms of sovereignty, rather than
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inhabiting one of them, hence their hybridity. This can be seen clearly through the
example of the USA, which is presently the world’s only superpower. Bush’s use of
the discourse of good versus cvii and his depiction of the war on terror as a just are
even more important, as they show the hybrid nature of the American state. Indeed,
on the one hand, Bush’s discourses target an American people whose Other is the
ubiquitous terrorist network, and whose territory is threatened from a hostile outside,
which situate the USA within the paradigm of modem sovereignty. On the other
hand, the same discourses target the new international community, which came into
existence with Bush’s war on terror. The speciai status of the USA among other
developed countries goes back to its intemationalization of its structure of mie
through the on-going war on terror. It is through positing a postmodem enemy and
through the internationalization of the American “band of brothers” that the USA can
be situated within the postmodern paradigm ofsovereignty, as well (IV. 3. 291). In
this sense, the USA straddles the modem and postmodern paradigms of sovereignty.
I approached the current giobalizing world order with a view to articulating its
intricacies, through exploring the parallel US TV presenters, contributing editors to
the National Review Online, and authorities in public leadership draw between Henry
V and Bush. What I emphasized throughout my reading of the contemporary world
order is the fact that reading it only through Hardt and Negri’s Empire, or through
Passavant and Dean ‘s Empire ‘s New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri can, in no
way, lead us to a full understanding of that world order. Only a hybrid reading that
would bring together what is apparently two opposite ends of a spectnim, namely the
93
intemationalization ofthe American state and postmodem sovereignty, can do justice
to its complicated nature.
Bush’s discourse of good versus cvii, and his packaging the war on terror as a
just war enable him to target a postmodem American “hand of brothers” that is both
within the USA and beyond its boundaries. The first discourse mentioned above
testifies to the persistence of the modem nation-state, which defines its sovereign
territory and its citizens respectively agairist an outside and a threatening Other, and
situates the USA within the modem paradigm of sovereignty. The second discourse
explodes the boundaries this modem American national community, the way the war
on terror and transnational capital have exploded the American geographical space, to
include subject nation-states contributing to America’s war on terror.
Furthermore, in my iast chapter, I examined how we can understand the
specificities of the nature of our contemporary world through tracing the outiines of a
postmodem imperiai Polybian model in that world. The outcome of this reading was
a tripartite, hybrid, and postmodem empire. In this respect, the hybridity of this
empire stems from the fact that the three different forms of power, which constitute
it—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—are no longer separate functions, the way
we can see them in Henry V’s early modem England, or in Olivier’s modem Britain.
Rather, they are hybrid and no longer totally separate the one from the other. The
postmodem versions of the Polybian moUd, which we can trace in Shakespeare’s
Herny V, along with Henry’s war on France, enemy, and “hand ofbrothers” make the
parallel drawn between Bush and bis Shakespearean counterpart very insightful,
when it cornes to understanding the nature of the contemporary world order.
Conclusion
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Examining three moments in Shakespeare’s Herny V’s odyssey from 1599 to
the opening years of the twenty-first century gives us an insight into what Holdemess
calis “the real Shakespeare” (VS 93). It also reveals the nature of the world order in
which early modem England, Bntain of the 1 940s, and post 9/11 America are
situated. In fact, both Shakespeare’s play and Olivier’s adaptation of it can be
situated within what Hardt and Negri cali the paradigm of modem sovereignty (137).
As far as the parallel drawn between flenry V and Bush is concemed, it rather
situates twenty-first-century America within the paradigm of postmodem
sovereignty. In this sense, studying these three moments in the history of Herny V
uncannily enables us to stage the second part of Hardt and Negri’s Empire, namely
“Passages of Sovereignty,” through a Cultural Materialist reading of those moments.
More precisely, my study of the first two moments in that history examines the
outlines a modem sovereignty, mainly its emphasis on the binary oppositions
between Self and Other, the closure of the national territory, and the totalizing
national identity it imposes on its subjects. However, my reading of the play in light
of Weldes’s and Laffey’s article “Representing the International: Sovereignty after
Modemity?,” Hardt and Negri’s Empire, and the ongoing war on terror, allows us to
see the mutation of the modem version of the Shakespearean “hand of brothers,” and
the Polybian model. The mutation of these aspects of the play, as I showed at length
in my third chapter, characterize the current globalizing world order and underscore
the passage from modem sovereignty to imperial sovereignty.
In my first chapter, I examined Shakespeare’s Henry V and his plan of
national unification in relation to the two modes of kingship, namely the
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Machiavellian model and the Erasminan model of the Christian prince. Contrary to
what scholars such as Norman Rabkin and Sara Munson Deats argue, I showed that
Henry V is a Machiavellian prince, par excellence, rather than an ambivalent king
with both Christian and Machiavellian attributes. Indeed, in order to carry out his
historical task, Henry V relies on such as international war, religion, and a citizen
army. Furthermore, I considered Shakespeare’s recourse to deletion and distortion,
along wïth his aesthetic colonization of potential sites of dissent in Elizabethan
society and their centrality to the ideal picture of a unified England we see in Hemy
V.
In my second chapter, I studied a number of scenes Olivier deleted or
distorted in order to present British viewers, in the 1 940s, with an acceptable heroic
figure. The other aspect that played a key role in Olivier’s trimming of Shakespeare’s
play is the fact that the Ministry of Information sponsored his movie. Moreover, I
pointed out the importance of reading this adaptation as the culminating point of the
history of the MOI’s development and the significance of its being a feature film
rather than a documentary.
As far as the last chapter is concemed, I read the contemporary world order
and the centrality of the USA to it through an examination of the parallel between
Bush and Shakespeare’s Henry V. The conclusion I reached, in this respect, is the
fact that our contemporary world is characterized by the internationalization not only
of the American state, as a structure of mie, but also of such aspects of Shakespeare’s
play as the “band ofbrothers” and the Polybian model.
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